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The maritime industry in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is in the middle of a tur-
bulent period since the start of the financial and economic crisis in 2008. 
Whereas the field of maritime logistics started to recover from the beginning 
of 2010 the maritime industry is still facing times of low business activities. 
Nevertheless, maritime industry is still representing the industrial backbone of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, usually being responsible for approximately 20 % 
of the regional industrial turnover, more than 350 maritime companies and ap-
proximately 12 % of all industrial work places, representing more than 13,000 
jobs.  
In order to discuss future development perspectives of maritime industry in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpomern, the 4
th regional conference “Maritime Economy in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern” on 1. – 2. December 2010 will offer a forum for 
representatives from economy, science and politics. Due to the ongoing struc-
tural changes in maritime industry, new concepts and perspectives are neces-
sary. The conference discussions will be enriched by presentations from ex-
perts from Finland, Norway and Sweden giving their experiences on regional 
networks as success factors in transformation processes in maritime industry.  
This book consists of four papers concentrating on the situation of the ship-
building sector in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Germany. In contrast to the 
presentations and discussions during the conference the papers will give a 
broader view on background information as well as business environment and 
development than it would be possible in a short conference contribution only. 
All countries had and have their own traditions and experiences in maritime 
industry but also all of them took their own ways in developing and transform-
ing the classical shipbuilding sector towards a new perspective. In all four 
cases regional development and networking aspects played an important role 
for the elaboration of new concepts.  
After having read all four papers it will be obvious how important the re-
gional networking approach is for successful transformation processes and 
which lessons can be learned for the restructuring of maritime industry. One 
important message is that the future of European shipbuilding is only possible 
in the field of maritime high-tech products where the lessons learned from ini-
tiatives in all four countries are revealing important experiences of constraints 
for successful networking structures.  
 
Tallinn, November 2010 
 





Network Oriented Services in the Case of the Maritime Cluster in South-
Western Finland 
Abstract 
Today’s economy faces the complex and simultaneous process of globalisa-
tion and localisation. Although globalisation poses serious challenges for the 
traditional spatial units of policy-making, it has become clear, that place con-
tinues to matter. Due to globalisation, the local characteristics have become 
crucial which has strengthened the localisation trend of market activities. A 
spatial unit that seems to gain importance in the knowledge economy is a re-
gion (Kaskinen et. al. 2006). The regional environment of social capital has 
become as relevant as the national macro economic situation in determining 
the ability of enterprises to compete in the global economy (Goddard 2000). 
Due to the development, the interest has been focused on different kinds of re-
gional innovation systems (Autio 1998; Cooke et al. 2000; Doloreux 2002). 
Probably one of the most important single reasons has been the success story 
of the cluster approach. 
Shipbuilding has long traditions in South-Western Finland. The on-going 
roots of an industrial shipbuilding in Turku reach the year 1737, and tradition 
in Rauma goes back until the 1500’s. Nowadays, the entire maritime cluster is 
particularly well represented in the region, where we find companies repre-
senting all of the business areas within the cluster. 
The maritime cluster in South-Western Finland represents the modern clus-
ter in the purist sense in good and recently in bad. The most important part of 
the cluster, the STX shipyard is extremely specialised producing the largest 
and most luxurious cruisers in the world mainly for one customer and for one 
market area. The network of some 750 companies and their 14,000 employees 
have been tuned up to produce the top quality cruisers and they have expertise 
to do so. Each company in the network has its own role and the management 
of projects has improved ship by ship. Higher education institutions as well as 
the other educational institutions in Turku and elsewhere in Finland have been 
utilized in continuing education, R&D and innovation. One can’t underline 
enough the importance of the shipyard and the cluster for the economy of the 
Turku region, South-Western Finland but also for the whole country. 
Due to the severe recession during past 2-3 years the entire cluster is about 
to collapse if the new business opportunities can’t be found quickly. There is 
no hope or expectations on the jackpots like Allure of the Seas within coming 
years in Turku. However, authorities and cluster companies in Turku believe 
that Turku will build ships and cruisers also in the future. It will be the main 
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focus. The promising projects relate to the arctic areas and offshore markets 
and to the future markets like Brazil, Russia and Asia. The cluster builds its 
future on the highly specialized skills and competences e.g. in green technol-
ogy solutions. The luxury hunts favoured by the billionaires have been men-
tioned as one opportunity. There can be as many as 5-6 lids and length of 
these vessels can exceed a hundred metres. The expected markets for these 
hunts are of the same size with passenger ships. The most important objective 
of the development measures is to keep the cluster alive and the key compa-
nies vital. This is how the disappearance of advanced know-how would like to 
be prevented. It is again needed when the next boost emerges.  
Thematic framework 
Place continues to matter 
Terms like rapid change, networking, globalisation, localisation and knowl-
edge intensity have been used to characterize the contemporary world. The fu-
ture success will come to those enterprises that can meet the global standard, 
join global networks and create operational models that apply to quickly 
changing market trends. The competitiveness of the enterprise depends on 
skilful employees and innovative products or services. On the other hand, the 
well-being of municipalities and regions depends on vital enterprises (God-
dard 1997). The regional availability of knowledge and skills and ability to 
develop technological capabilities has become as important as the physical in-
frastructure. The regional environment of social capital has become as relevant 
as the national macro economic situation in determining the ability of enter-
prises to compete in the global economy. Accordingly, universities are ex-
pected more than ever to actively engage in the development of their regions. 
A regionally engaged university has become a key asset and powerhouse for 
regional economic development and the establishment of regional innovation 
structures (Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Goddard 2000). 
Due to the above-mentioned development, the interest has been focused on 
different kinds of regional innovation systems (Autio 1998; Cooke et al. 2000; 
Doloreux 2002). Probably one of the most important single reasons has been 
the success story of the cluster approach. Michael Porter (1998) argues that 
today when companies can source capital, goods, information and technology 
from around the world very easily, much of the conventional wisdom about 
how companies compete needs to be overhauled. In theory, more open global 
markets and faster transportation and communication should diminish the role 
of location in competition. Anything that can be effectively sourced from a 
distant place through global markets and corporate networks is available to 
any company and therefore is essentially nullified as a source of competitive 
advantage. However, location remains fundamental to competition, states Por-
ter. Its role is just different than a generation ago.  
In an era when competition was driven heavily by input costs, locations  
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with some important endowment – natural harbour or supply of cheap labour – 
often enjoyed comparative advantage that was both competitively decisive and 
persistent over time (Porter 1998). Competition today is far more dynamic. 
Companies can mitigate many input cost disadvantages through global sourc-
ing. Today, competitive advantages rest on making more productive use of in-
puts, which requires continual innovation. According to Porter, this means that 
immediate business environment outside the company plays as vital a role as 
functions inside the company. Thus, the enduring competitive advantages in a 
global economy lie increasingly in local things – knowledge, relationships and 
motivations – that rivals cannot match. This role of locations has been over-
looked, despite striking evidence that innovation and competitive success in so 
many fields are geographically concentrated. Porter has summed up his state-
ment in an idea of a cluster: critical masses of unusual competitive success in 
the particular field in one place. These clusters attract more new companies, 
suppliers and customers than a single company could alone and that’s why 
they have to be considered when any company makes site selection decisions. 
The cluster approach goes along with the concept of economies of agglomera-
tion. The concept describes the benefits that companies obtain when locating 
near each other. As more companies in related industries cluster together, 
costs of production may decline significantly because companies have com-
peting suppliers, greater specialization and division of labour. 
Thus, today’s economy faces the complex and simultaneous process of 
globalisation and localisation. Although globalisation poses serious challenges 
for the traditional spatial units of policy-making, it has become clear, that 
place continues to matter. Due to globalisation, the local characteristics have 
become crucial which has strengthened the localisation trend of market activi-
ties. A spatial unit that seems to gain importance in the knowledge economy is 
a region (Kaskinen et. al. 2006). 
The importance of the region and regional innovation system underlines the 
role of regional interdependencies. The concepts like triple helix and learning 
region or economy have been utilized to explain the current processes. The 
theory of triple helix connects the traditional categories of the innovation 
economy with institutional and evolutionary economics, joining three main in-
stitutional sectors – public, private and academics (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005). 
The statement is that in a knowledge-based society the boundaries between 
public and private sector, science and technology, university and industry are 
increasingly fading, giving rise to a system of overlapping interactions, which 
did not previously exist (Ughetto, 2007). Florida (1995) argues that regions 
must be defined by the same criteria and elements which comprise a knowl-
edge-intensive firm: continuous improvement, new ideas, knowledge creation 
and organisational learning. Regions must adopt the principles of knowledge 
creation and continuous learning. In other words, they must become learning 
regions. In his statement on learning economy Bengt-Åke Lundvall (Goddard  
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2000) argues that learning economy is characterised by the following features: 
•  the success of individuals and firms reflects the capacity to learn (and forget 
old practices); 
•  change is rapid and old skills get obsolete and new skills are in demand; 
•  learning includes skills and the building of competencies, not just increased 
access to information;  
•  learning is on-going in all parts of society, not just high-tech sectors; 
•  net job creation is in knowledge intensive sectors.  
Interaction as the basis for learning and innovation 
One of the significant features in all approaches of regional development dur-
ing the past 20 years has been the increasing awareness on the universities’ 
role in regional clusters and innovation systems. As the OECD (2007) has 
pointed out, universities through their research, teaching and community en-
gagement can be the key actors fostering and supporting regional innovation. 
Universities can take a leading role in innovation, complementing and not just 
supporting the business. While for decades universities have been seen as 
structures for providing trained personal and generating knowledge, the con-
temporary university is an amalgam of teaching, research, entrepreneurial and 
scholastic interests providing qualified graduates and researchers, but also of-
fering innovative solutions through technology transfer mechanisms which 
enhance links with the local industry system. As a result, and as a consequence 
of the conjectural financial situation, governments are rethinking how to 
maximise the benefits from higher education in order to use them as principal 
agents for regional development and assist economic recovery. Within this tri-
angle, universities are the knowledge source, industry puts into practice this 
knowledge through technology transfer mechanisms, and governments pro-
vide resources to facilitate the interaction between all the agents of innovation 
systems and policies (Etzkowitz et al. 2000). 
By any means and in one form or another, regions are presently trying to at-
tain some form of triple helix partnerships, clusters and learning economies. 
The common objective is to build an innovative environment by generating al-
ternative strategies for economic growth and social transformation such us 
university spin-offs, tri-lateral initiatives for knowledge based economic de-
velopment and strategic alliances among the parties. However successful re-
gional cooperation is reliant on the ability of all the key organizational players 
- universities, government/public authorities and business – to establish strong 
and feasible partnerships (Vilalta 2010). How well the dynamic dialogue func-
tions between the producers of information, and on the other hand, the dis-
tributors and users of information, defines how much of this potentiality of re-
gional competitiveness will be realized for the benefit of the enterprises (God-
dard & Chatterton 1999). We can talk about a regional innovation system or a 
learning region when the regional community, formed by the producers, dis- 
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tributors and users of information, begins to participate widely in the strength-
ening of expertise and in the creation of innovations. This is when the com-
munity develops such resources, which makes it distinguishable from other 
regions (Kostiainen 1999; Lemola 2004). 
Regional development is an innovation process, which crucially depends on 
interaction. Interaction is the basis for learning and innovation and hence 
eventually for the economic prosperity of regions. As Pirjo Ståhle and Markku 
Sotarauta (2003) state, innovation is not a technical process even if it results in 
new technology. People create innovations and achieve results, and that is why 
innovating is mainly a human and a social process. When considering a poten-
tial of a region or company for competitiveness, from whichever viewpoint, 
the cooperation and the networking between right people become the focal 
point. From the perspective of an enterprise, this means firstly gaining infor-
mation about the top level experts relevant to their area of business, and sec-
ondly, creating confidential and strong relationships with them. Thus, one of 
the central aims of a regional innovation system and focus of the regional au-
thorities should be to create possibilities for business and experts from differ-
ent fields to meet, and to promote the interaction between knowledge produc-
ers, disseminators and users. The operational environments, which channel 
and enrich the flows of information and enable fluent communication, and 
thereby also make the information accessible and processable are more than 
crucial for the business and regional development in the globalised economy. 
More than 20 years ago, Martin and Irvine (1989) pointed out that five 
premises should be taken into account when successful partnerships are 
looked for:  
1. communication (bring together disparate groups in an arena to discuss and 
interact),  
2. concentration on the long term (think forward),  
3. coordination (through networks and partnerships),  
4. consensus (attainment of a common vision) and  
5. commitment (desire to implement the common vision in the light of a com-
mon output). 
The maritime cluster of South-Western Finland 
The cluster in a nutshell
1 
Shipbuilding has long traditions in South-Western Finland. The on-going 
roots of an industrial shipbuilding in Turku reach the year 1737, and tradition 
                                           
1   The chapter is based on the data of the 2 surveys conducted by the Centre for Maritime 
Studies in the University of Turku. Karvonen et. al. (2006), Meri yhdistää osaamisen. 
Lounaisen Suomen meriklusterin perusselvitys. Merenkulkualan koulutus- ja 
tutkimuskeskus, Turun yliopisto, Paino-Kaarina. Karvonen, T. & Holma, E. (2009), 
Lounais-Suomen meriklusteri 2009. Publications from the Centre for Maritime Studies, 
University of Turku, B171.  
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in Rauma goes back until the 1500’s. The maritime cluster is a functional en-
tity comprised of many different industries and businesses. It includes e.g. 
navigation fields, maritime industries, and port operations in the private and 
public sectors. The sea plays the unifying role for all of these businesses and 
operations. The maritime cluster businesses and industries are particularly sig-
nificant for the Counties of Southwest Finland and Satakunta in South-
Western Finland. 
The shipbuilding industry, shipping and port operations form the core of the 
maritime cluster. Around these are a large number of sub-contractors, suppli-
ers, partners, associated businesses, various professionals and academic train-
ing and research facilities, public administration, unions and associations. The 
combination of all these contributors forms a solid maritime cluster. The mari-
time cluster includes e.g. shipyards, ship equipment manufacturers, marine 
suppliers, ship design offices and offshore industries, shipping companies 
handling both passengers and goods, traffic, ship supply and clearance com-
panies, classification societies, ports, companies specialising in port technol-
ogy, port operators, and other service providers related to sea transport. Ex-
amples of significant associated businesses include financing and insurance 
companies. 
The entire maritime cluster is particularly well represented in the region of 
South-Western Finland, where we find companies representing all of the busi-
ness areas within the cluster. The maritime cluster holds great relative signifi-
cance for the regional economy and industries in South-Western Finland. Only 
the maritime cluster in the Åland islands has greater importance. In the Coun-
ties of Southwest Finland and Satakunta, the maritime cluster includes ap-
proximately 400 companies with a total of almost 500 operational sites and of-
fices. The numbers differ a little depending on the ways of calculation. Some 
estimations show that the total number of companies linked in the cluster is 
750.  
In 2008, the combined turnover of the maritime cluster companies in 
Southwest Finland and Satakunta totalled approximately 4 billion euro. Of this 
amount, about 3.5 billion euro came directly from the maritime sector, which 
signifies any company activities related to navigation, maritime industries and 
port operations. The direct economic impact and multiplier effects of the mari-
time cluster extend in a significant fashion to the economy of the entire region. 
In the Counties of Southwest Finland and Satakunta, the maritime cluster 
provided work for approximately 17,100 people in 2008, of which 12,700 
were directly employed in the maritime sector. Of this number, nearly 8,800 
people are employed in the maritime industries. In addition, the public sector 
involved in the maritime cluster employs approximately 1,000 people. The 
maritime cluster employs approximately 6 % of the entire employed popula-
tion in Southwest Finland and Satakunta. The indirect employment impacts 
are conservatively estimated to be no less than 1.5-fold and extend to numer- 
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ous fields of business located throughout the region. When the numbers of di-
rect and indirect jobs supported by the maritime cluster are combined, the total 
for Southwest Finland and Satakunta can be more than 27,000 people, or ap-
proximately 8.5 % of the employed population in the region. 
Of the entire Finnish maritime cluster, the combined share for Southwest 
Finland and Satakunta is roughly estimated for one third, but the share fluctu-
ates greatly in the different fields of business within the cluster. The region 
holds the largest relative significance to the shipbuilding industry, as nearly 90 
% of the shipyard jobs in Finland are located in this region. This region also 
handles about one fourth of the country’s shipyard operations. During 2005, 
nearly 24 % of all the marine traffic between Finland and foreign countries 
was handled by the ports in South-Western Finland. The combined turnover 
for the public ports of the region represented 25 % of the entire turnover of the 
all public ports of Finland. 
The maritime cluster and, in particular, the shipbuilding and mechanical en-
gineering industries and navigation have far-reaching historical traditions in 
South-Western Finland, and this is viewed as an important strength for the 
cluster. The advantages offered by tradition are further boosted by an ever-
expanding, broad and comprehensive network of sub-contractors and suppli-
ers, high-standard and highly multi-professional maritime expertise and the 
proximity of the region to the sea. The region also offers diverse training op-
portunities for maritime-related fields and the supply of labour is quite good. 
However, the demand for professionally skilled employees exceeds the supply 
in many of the business areas of the maritime cluster, as is the case in the 
shipbuilding industry in particular. According to the cluster companies, the re-
gion’s most important competitive advantages, compared with other regions in 
Finland, are its location, the competence of its employees, technological ex-
pertise and a functional network of subcontractors.  
The one cornerstone of the cluster is the significance of B-to-B cooperation. 
Companies operating in different fields benefit from mutual interaction and 
the network of expertise is a central factor of the cluster. In Southwest Finland 
and Satakunta, co-operation and networks have been exploited well and are 
viewed as a necessary area for development. In addition to business activities 
(including ports), there is a significant number of public sector organisations 
and similar actors in South-Western Finland. Many public sector organisations 
are working in close co-operation with the maritime cluster either directly or 
indirectly. All of these parties are joined by the single objective to improve the 
operational models and environment of the companies within the maritime 
cluster. Active participants in the region include the Finnish Maritime Ad-
ministration, Customs, the Finnish State Pilotage Enterprise, the Border 
Guard, the Finnish Navy, the Centre for Economic Development, Transport 
and the Environment, Finnvera, and the Finnish Seamen’s Service MEPA. Un-
ions, associations (e.g. the Finnish Lifeboat Society) and other organisations,  
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such as the Finnish Seamen’s Mission, also play an active role in the regional 
activities. 
Training and educational organisations have their own significant place in 
the maritime cluster and in securing its future. The region provides a solid 
foundation for the businesses operating within the maritime cluster by offering 
training and further education opportunities at vocational schools, secondary 
education institutes, the universities of applied sciences and universities. The 
region is also strongly engaged in research and development activities. 
The recession of the maritime industry 
The maritime cluster in South-Western Finland represents the modern cluster 
in the purest sense in good and recently in bad. The most important part of the 
cluster, the STX shipyard is extremely specialised, producing the largest and 
most luxurious cruisers in the world mainly for one customer and for one mar-
ket area. The network of some 750 companies and their 14,000 employees 
have been tuned up to produce the top quality cruisers and they have expertise 
to do so. Each company in the network has its own role and the management 
of projects has improved ship by ship. Higher education institutions as well as 
the other educational institutions in Turku and elsewhere in Finland have been 
utilized in continuing education, R&D and innovation. One can’t underline 
enough the importance of the shipyard and the cluster for the economy of the 
Turku region, South-Western Finland but also for the whole country.  
The maritime cluster in South-Western Finland has developed along the 
global growth of the cruise industry. The cruise industry has been one of the 
fastest growing segments worldwide within travel and leisure industry (Finpro 
2009). The number of passengers has kept an average annual growth rate of 
7 % since 1980’s. The industry has been expected to keep the steady growth 
also in coming years. However, everything halted in 2009 along the deepening 
of the global economic recession. 
Global economic recession influenced the maritime cluster in South-
Western Finland too. The growth numbers in turnover and employees of the 
cluster companies turned down in 2008 and the curve deepened in 2009. The 
number of the new orders decreased 30 – 40 % in 2009. The situation of 
course varies company by company depending on company’s field and duties. 
Those who are involved in planning and design lost the job already in 2009 
when the companies of interior decoration are fully booked also in 2010.  
The latest milestone was inscribed in October 2010 when the Allure of the 
Seas, again the largest cruiser in the world, departed from the Turku harbour. 
It reminds us of the reverse side of the global economy and possible setbacks 
of the extremely specialised cluster approach. After the departure of the Allure 
of the Seas, the STX shipyard is a silent place. After the years of rapid growth 
and steady flow of new orders, the order portfolio of the shipyard was empty. 
Although there are some negotiations and some new minor jobs all work  
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places in the shipyard and the vitality of the sub-contractors can’t be guaran-
teed. The shipyard will be empty at least the year 2011 during the planning 
and design of the new ships. For the cluster itself the situation is extremely 
challenging. If the shipyard can’t offer job opportunities, the sub-contracting 
companies have to look for new businesses elsewhere. This means that Turku 
looses the versatile, specialized and competent network that the building of the 
world’s most luxurious and largest cruisers demand. Re-establishing the net-
work can be difficult and at least takes time that is not a commodity within a 
business labelled by extreme competition (Lindqvist 2010). 
For the economy of the Turku region and whole South-Western Finland the 
situation is more than challenging. Although the sub-contractors have spread 
around the country the majority locates in the region. According to the worst 
scenarios, the unemployment rate in Turku can rise up to 15 %. The problem-
atic scenario can be explained partly by the fact that during the years of 
growth nearly all cluster companies had to increase violently and recruit all 
possible professionals from near and far to survive with the new orders. To-
day, companies have to give an employee notices due to the lack of work. Di-
rect and indirect economic impacts on the development of the region are sig-
nificant. Indeed, the highly developed networking has doubled the challenges. 
Along the growth of the out-sourcing percentage the number of companies de-
pendent on the shipyard has risen. The share of the out-sourced build-up on 
the total value of shipbuilding has increased ship by ship. The share was 38% 
in 2006 when the Freedom of the Seas was handed over, 52% with the Liberty 
of the Seas and even 75% with the Oasis of the Seas in 2009 (Lindqvist 2010). 
The regional Compass working group appointed to save the maritime clus-
ter and representing local, regional and national public authorities and busi-
ness and education sectors has estimated that the 1/3 of the cluster companies 
is in good shape as the companies have other cornerstones and business opera-
tions beside maritime industry. These companies have been also active in 
starting new projects and scanning new markets. 1/3 of the companies has se-
vere challenges and will probably give up if there won’t be new orders soon. 
Those companies have been almost totally dependent on the shipyard and have 
been maybe sub-contractors of the sub-contractors. One field in this basket is 
interior decoration. For them it is, however, relatively easy to find other busi-
ness opportunities from the mainland. The last 1/3 of the companies consists 
of companies that are in comparatively good shape but that need public subsi-
dies and finance to survive during the worst years. These companies have 
promising new projects and potential new core businesses (Lindqvist 2010). 
The next steps of the cluster 
There is no hope or expectations on the jackpots like the Allure of the Seas 
within coming years in Turku. Turku has delivered five cruisers during the last 
five years for the same market. It is clear that the Royal Caribbean Line and  
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the other possible shipping companies look at 3-4 years before they will do 
new orders. However, authorities and cluster companies in Turku believe that 
Turku shipyard will build ships and cruisers also in the future. It will be the 
main focus. The promising projects relate to the arctic areas and offshore mar-
kets and to the future markets like Brazil, Russia and Asia. The cluster builds 
its future on the highly specialized skills and competences e.g. in green tech-
nology solutions. The luxury hunts favoured by the billionaires have been 
mentioned as one opportunity. There can be as many as 5-6 lids and length of 
these vessels can exceed a hundred metres. The expected markets for these 
hunts are of the same size as passenger ships. The most important objective of 
the development measures is to keep the cluster alive and the key companies 
vital. This is how the disappearance of advanced know-how would like to be 
prevented. It is again needed when the next boost emerges (Lindqvist 2010; 
Karvonen & Holma 2009; Suomen Kuvalehti 2010). 
No matter in subsidy policy or new innovations in the maritime sector, 
many companies have to look for totally new business opportunities. Then the 
attention should be on their really high-level competences in issues like pro-
ject management and 3D imaging. The question is how these competences 
could be utilized in other fields of business.  
Based on the survey conducted in 2009 (Karvonen & Holma), the following 
future opportunities can be identified. 
•  Internationalisation. The level of internationalisation of SMEs in maritime 
industry is relatively low although the business itself is really global. How-
ever, the latest recession roused also SMEs and the majority of the compa-
nies is interested in international operations, networking as well as customer 
relationships. Markets in Russia and elsewhere in Asia, the Far East, Brazil, 
and Germany from Europe have been mentioned. In practice, internationali-
sation is still challenging. It is a new approach and operational environment, 
it is not included in the strategic processes and even the language causes 
problems. The economic risks of course lift the threshold. 
•  Further specialisation. Companies believe that the future of the European 
shipbuilding will be based on highly specialised ships demanded by ad-
vanced competences. The whole cluster, from the main shipyard to every 
sub-contractor and service provider, has to up-date and develops its proc-
esses, cost-efficiency and know-how. Offshore markets and new kinds of 
ship models are mentioned as promising approaches. Companies also be-
lieve that tightened regulations and standards e.g. in energy-efficiency, dis-
charge limits and the used fuel of the new ships bring business. Finnish 
companies are quite competent in these areas. 
•  New business. The majority of companies that want to stay alive need to 
find new business opportunities and customers from the mainland beyond 
the maritime industry. The cruiser industry employed vast amounts of 
SMEs specialised in interior decoration. New approaches in the maritime  
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sector don’t offer so many opportunities for them. However, it is quite easy 
for these companies to find business also from the mainland projects. The 
variety and number of customers should of course be bigger.  
Conclusion 
The maritime cluster of South-Western Finland has produced one of the great-
est cruisers in the world. The cluster and the shipyard have concentrated on 
the large and luxury cruisers. It has been a strategic decision taken already be-
fore the latest Korean owner, and clearly a successful one. Afterwards, it is 
easy to say that maybe the decision was wrong in the end, especially because 
the shipyard became heavily dependent on one customer, Royal Caribbean 
Line, and on the one market. Many shipyards abroad have more versatile pro-
files and thus are in a better position.  
However, the strategic decision made in Turku followed the rules of the 
cluster approach as well as the facts on competitive advantages in the global 
economy. A region has to specialize and a region has to find its characteristic 
profile that distinguishes it from the other regions. Based on these decisions 
the region has to establish the regional innovation system and regional net-
works with triple helix consortium aiming to fulfil the joint vision. This has to 
be the guideline to pursue in South-Western Finland in the future as well. 
However, it will be reasonable to base the future on some relatively large cor-
nerstones of the cluster instead of only one, no matter how big it would be.  
When we estimate the correctness of the taken decisions, we have to re-
member that the European and global shipbuilding industry is quite sick 
(Lindqvist 2010). Without the public support and subsidies, these vessels 
would be built neither in Finland nor in Europe. As part of the regional part-
nerships and innovation networks it is of course the duty of political and re-
gional authorities to support regional industry as much as possible. Still, there 
should be clearer global regulations. The amount of money and the strength of 
political decisions can influence in the game. Location and local strengths and 
characteristics that rivals cannot match continue to matter in global economy, 
but money seems to be the number three.  
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Regional Networking as Success Factor in the Convention Process of 
Maritime Industry – the Swedish Experience 
Paper presented at the conference in Rostock the 2
nd of December 2010. 
1. Swedish industry 
Swedish industry has its roots due to the forests and the iron ore.  
The steel industry was and still is an active part of the Swedish imagination 
even if its importance now is only a fraction of what it was. But it was an im-
portant factor in the development of the shipbuilding industry and vice versa 
shipbuilding stimulated the development of the modern steel mills in Bor-
länge, Luleå and Oxelösund which all produced steel for the shipyards and car 
factories. 
Another close development sector were the steel mills specializing for drills 
like Sandviken, Atlas Copco and Seco Tools, steel for ball bearings, SKF, and 
even smaller factories like Ramnäs building cables for the shipyards and later 
oil-platforms and AGA welding-sets. 
Forest industries were also both state and private. State owned Assi-Domän 
is a big owner of forests and industries while the private ones have been 
merged together in Sweden as a first step and then very often with Finnish 
partners like Stora-Enso. 
Another important path has been the innovations that were made in the 19
th 
and early 20
th centuries like SKF (ball-bearings), Alfa Laval (separators) and 
Electrolux (white goods). 
A fourth sector was stimulated in the national emphasis in the 1950s using 
the state companies as important buyers of new technology to stimulate R&D 
in partnership like Televerket (Swedish Telecoms) and Ericsson (mobile tele-
phone systems), Vattenfall and ASEA (today ABB) (high voltage transmis-
sion) and university hospitals with medical R&D and Astra (today Astra Se-
neca), Pharmacia and the former state company KABI. 
In Sweden, as in many other countries, military procurements are also used 
in a way of stimulating high technology development like SAAB for military 
planes, Volvo Aero for aircraft engines, Bofors for guns and dynamite 
(AKZO-Nobel), Hägglunds for armoured vehicles (today owned by BAE) and 
Kockums for boats and submarines. Other shipyards had also had their share 
in the first part of the 20
th century. 
The Swedish industry was very successful in bringing up multinational 
firms (MNF) and together with Switzerland still in the 1990s had a larger 
amount of companies in the top 500 than most countries in relation to the size 
of the population. 
                                           
*   CEO Kalmar R&D Foundation.  
 
18 
A new wave started in the 1990s when IT deregulations were set and new 
companies started like Tele2, Europolitan and a number of small operators but 
it also opened up for international companies like the merger between Swedish 
Telecoms and Sonera in Finland (Telia Sonera) and Telenor.  
The state supported/subsidized the buying of personal computers in the 
1980s, the building of broadband in the 1990s and Sweden was for some years 
leading in using IT products like computers and internet. The IT-bubble 
crashed in the beginning of 2001 and since then the development has been 
more modest and other countries like Korea have passed Sweden in broadband 
subscriptions. Sweden is still one of top ten in these fields. 
After the second world-war two new global companies have started in Swe-
den with a new and different approach like IKEA and HM in the trade sector 
and one, Tetrapak, following the historical trend using an innovation. The 
Swedish banking system has also been able to survive due to early adoption of 
the IT-systems. The banking system has been able to increase its international 
efforts after the banking crisis in the early 1990s and it looks like it is manag-
ing to survive the latest financial crisis as well. 
2. Swedish shipbuilding industry 
1840-1940 
As in Germany and other European countries the shipbuilding industries 
started in the middle of the 19
th century. First will be given a brief description 
of the start and what happened up to the beginning of the 1940s. 
Motala shipyard at the lake Vättern was the first to produce a modern ship, 
actually the post-boat made for the route Ystad to Greifswald in 1840. 
In Gothenburg, two shipyards started within a few years 1841, 1844 and 
was followed by a third in 1873, and the one in Malmö started in 1870 (a 
small remark, the big Swedish construction company Skanska was started 
1871 by the same owner).  
The real growth came in the 1930s when the Swedish ship building indus-
tries became more productive than their competitors from UK and Germany. 
A figure mentioned is that the Swedes were 3-4 times better than the British. 
But it was also a period of expansion in the international trade where Swedish, 
Danish and Norwegian companies were successful in exporting their goods 
and also to build up companies for transporting it. 
In 1933, after the financial crisis, Sweden was the biggest producer in the 
world of commercial tonnage and kept a position among the three biggest pro-
ducing countries up to the 1960s. 
1945 and onwards 
After the world war Kockums was the biggest producer of commercial ton-
nage and later Uddevalla shipyard in 1957 was number 3 in the world. Udde-
valla was created by a private person, the legendary Gustaf Thordén, who ac- 
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tually bought a shipyard 1947 from the US (Kayser Wharf in Providence). 
This is worth reminding us when we are worried over that the Chinese are 
moving over industrial buildings from Sweden or Germany today. 
Another important step was taken in Gothenburg 1963 when the shipyards 
started to move out their new production from the inner city building to a 
completely new wharf in Arendal. That was the first one where the ships were 
built totally under roof. The time for delivery was halved. 
But the problems occurred quickly. The Japanese industry recovered very 
rapidly after the war and was successful with a new export-driven economy 
steered by MITI, the department for Industry and Trade. MITI introduced new 
strategic goals like Japanese export products should be transported on ships 
built in Japan. MITI came up with a solution that included state subsidies, 
loans up to 80 % of the investment and with 8 years of lifetime. 
The Japanese salaries were at the time only 40 % of the Swedish ones and 
the new industries were also built very competitive. This caused a Swedish 
debate over the coming years about state subsidiaries or not. Sweden had at 
the time a company, Statsföretag (State Companies), which aim was to take 
care of major industrial sectors with problems and the Shipbuilding industry 
would very soon be of highest interest because of the great importance for 
some regions.  
Götaverken/Eriksberg was still number 7 in the world 1964 thanks to the 
new Arendal shipyard but the first six were all Japanese. 
Svenska Varv (State Shipbuilding Company) was founded in 1977, the first 
shipyard acquired was Öresundsvarvet in Landskrona, later in 1979 also 
Kockums, Götaverken and Uddevalla, all the big ones (plus some smaller ones 
like Finnboda in Stockholm). 
The last ship launched in Lindholmen was in1970, Eriksberg in1979 and 
Götaverken 1982 (containership Nihon). Götaverken then had an intermediate 
period with oil-platforms 1982-85 and finally made a new attempt with ships 
where the last one was the ice-breaker Oden 1989.  
The shipyard in Uddevalla launched its last boat in 1986. 
The big shipyard in Malmö, Kockums, launched its last civilian boat 1987 
but had managed to achieve a huge order of submarines 1987 from Australia 
that kept it going for another ten years. 
In 1987, a new state group was founded, called Celsius, where a number of 
companies with a military significance were merged including Kockums and 
Öresundsvarvet. 
3. State interventions 
The discussions in Sweden were politically very intense in the 1970s on the 
coming solutions. In the end this was manifested in the creation of “Svenska 
Varv” in 1977 but then the new government was split on this view. “Is it a 
good strategy or not to put more money in the sector or leave it to the Japanese  
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and use the money to change the structure of the hit regions instead”. 
Some of the shipyards were so big that in some places like Landskrona and 
Uddevalla they had a major impact on the small labour markets in those small 
towns and even Malmö a somewhat bigger town was strongly affected. Malmö 
was at the time an industrial town and was slowly changing to something new. 
The Swedish bank-crisis in 1991-1994 including a lot of turmoil on the 
Swedish currency also caused a loss of a lot of industrial jobs all over Sweden 
but of course industrial towns were most severely hit. 
In the 1980s the Swedish car industry, however small, was seen as a high-
tech industry and the future for Sweden. It was also strong in some areas, es-
pecially in Gothenburg wider region. In the year 1985, during the parliamen-
tary election campaign, the problems had grown so big at Uddevalla shipyard 
that the government persuaded Volvo to locate its expansion plant aimed for 
Kalmar with 40,000 cars to Uddevalla instead. 
At the same time the city of Malmö was promised a new SAAB factory that 
was planned and an industrial hall was actually built on the shipyard premises. 
However, the car industry in Sweden soon got their own problems and the 
car factories in Uddevalla and Kalmar were closed in 1993 and 1994 respec-
tively and the SAAB factory in Malmö never produced any cars. 
The Kalmar factory was, when it closed, also announced as the most effi-
cient factory in the world together with a Lexus factory in Japan. But it was 
seen as too small and so was Uddevalla when Volvo concentrated its produc-
tion to Gothenburg and Gent in Belgium. The CEO at the time, Sören Gyll, 
had as his major idea that a plant needs to produce at least 200,000 cars per 
year to be efficient. 
But tough as it was, that was only the start for the car industry, and the 
measures taken were not enough. The Swedish cars were sold out in the late 
1990s to Ford (Volvo) and GM (SAAB). 
And this year, 2010, Ford sold Volvo to the Chinese Company Geely and 
GM sold SAAB to the Dutch company Spyker (with Russian capital).  
4. Kalmar 
The shipyard in Kalmar was never a big one, 400 employees at the shipyards 
and 200 at the subcontractors, but the history of that small wharf island will be 
used in more detail to show some interesting features in the total change of the 
island. 
The Shipyard Island (Varvsholmen ), as it is still called today, was from the 
beginning a tiny island used by the Swedish navy in the 17
th century until the 
military shipyard was moved to Karlskrona. The size of the island increased 
continuously as the shipyard demanded new docks and other facilities. 
When the shipyard first went bankrupt in 1980, KIFAB, the industrial real 
estate company of the city, bought the island to help the company to make a 
new start. The new shipyard, Kalmar Fartygsreparationer, specialized in main- 
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tenance and repair which was a very common strategy for many Swedish new 
starters but also used among the bigger shipyards trying to find a second or 
third pillar.  
Kalmar shipyard also built some smaller, specialized boats. It worked out 
well in the beginning and the company bought back the island from the city. 
However in 1987 the last boat left the island and there was a dead lock. 
The Mayor of the city at the time could not accept to see the island as a 
housing area but only as an industrial one. A building company, CA Bygg, 
then bought the island. 
CA Bygg presented plans for building 800-1000 flats on the island and in-
troduced the concept to the new Mayor of the city in 1990. The idea was ap-
proved in general terms but the city had some remarks on the high density.  
The bank crisis in Sweden 1991-1994 also hit the building sector very se-
verely. A number of subsidiaries to the sector were taken away in the state 
budgets. That meant that in Kalmar (like in many other cities in Sweden) only 
flats for elderly people and students were built in the 1990s. 
CA Bygg went bankrupt and there was a dead lock up to 1995 when the 
bank, SE-banken, that now “owned” the island approached the city and asked 
if Kalmar would like to buy it.  
The Mayor at the time thought that this would be an interesting idea but he 
also had to consider the fact that CA Fastigheter (parent company of CA 
Bygg) was still involved. After negotiations between the parties in summer 
1995 both sides came up with a solution that Kalmar bought the island and 
made an agreement with CA Fastigheter that the company would have options 
up to 40 % of the island. These options were described in detail. 
This started an interesting co-operation between the city and the private 
company that has worked out well for ten years now. The last negotiation took 
part just before summer 2010 and opened up for further construction work that 
will go on for another five years. 
The idea from the beginning was to create, not only a new housing area, but 
a mix between businesses and housing, more like an old fashioned city block. 
The City arranged an  
Architect’s competition for the island where the public was involved and 
the result was a small scale, rather cosy environment.  
But things went in another direction. 
The first step in this new direction was the building of an office for the 
company Intenna. Intenna, making antennas for mobile phones, already ex-
isted on the island in one of the old buildings, and had started to grow. A re-
mark is that some of the remaining industrial buildings were used for new 
companies and one industrial building was even removed to another industrial 
area in the city.  
Intenna also wanted to build a factory on the island but the city opposed the 
plans and the question finally solved itself as the factory was placed in Nan- 
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jing, China. The company had started a joint venture with Panda Industries. 
This was the first actual contact between Kalmar and China. Intenna was later 
bought by Flextronics and moved to other premises on the island. The Finnish-
Swedish consultancy group Tieto became the new tenant. 
The second office building was built for Europolitan, one of the new tele-
com companies, starting a call-centre (Europolitan is now owned by Telenor). 
Kalmar had been trying to get that company to the city three years earlier but 
this time Kalmar had the possibility to offer a better location than its competi-
tors. 
The third building was a joint effort by moving the Science Park (started in 
1994) to new premises in “Kalmar Science Park” together with ten other com-
panies including Intenna.  
The university, the City and Kalmar Region in co-operation had managed to 
attract the Swedish Pharmacy (Apoteket AB) to build their second advanced 
call-centre in Sweden.  
The ultimate reason why they chose Kalmar was the new and very good 
Pharmaceutical university education in Kalmar and the possibility to set up a 
new co-operation with the university in e-Health and the new and very good 
premises. 
Parallel to this CA and Kalmarhem (the City owned housing company) 
started to build a housing complex on the south side of the island with co-
operative apartments and flats for tenants. 
Later on, this has been followed up by more apartments and single houses. 
In the final plan there is still room for another office-building as an extension 
of the science park and the last negotiations also opened up for elderly housing 
and small shops. 
The offices are owned by KIFAB, some housing by Kalmarhem and some 
by CA but most of the new ones are co-operatives or owned by private per-
sons. 
It may seem as a long time from 1987 to 2015 to achieve this change but on 
the other hand it has also offered good possibilities to rethink over time and to 
meet new demands as the market changes for new trends. But the big lines on 
the map formed in 2000 are the same today. 
It is interesting to look at the public debate. In 1990 the total building per-
mit asked for by CA Bygg was 45,000 square metres which was then opposed 
by the City as too much. In the architectural competition the goal was lowered 
to 25,000. When all buildings will be on place around 2015 the new number of 
square-meters will be close to 100,000. 
The beautiful view on the sound Kalmarsund and the island Öland, the close 
location to the city centre has made this a very popular area and in spite of 
high prices have made it an interesting place for a number of people moving to 
Kalmar. 
Some landmarks of the shipyard have been saved like two smaller cranes,  
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the slipway and buildings around it. The small office building will also be left. 
The cranes look small today compared to the new land-mark, a multi-storey 
house called the “lipstick” and there is still a possibility to build an even 
higher building if someone would find it interesting. 
A final word must be said on the financing of this project. In the Swedish 
exploitation law the city can always ask the private companies to take the 
costs of the exploitation according to a detailed plan, costs like water, sewage, 
roads and parks in the blocks. But the so called over- all costs like the road to 
the block, major investments in the technical systems and some other general 
costs, in this case securing the sea-bank, are normally financed by taxes.  
The agreement between the City and CA Fastigheter was that these costs 
should be shared by the private company and the City in proportion to the 
built-up areas. This however meant that the City would need to allocate some 
4 million Euros in the budget. 
This problem was solved in 1999 by a business agreement between an en-
ergy company Graninge AB (later bought by EON) and the City where Gran-
inge AB bought half of Kalmar Energy. One part of the money was used to 
support R&D at the University College which had at the time been acknowl-
edged to do scientific work in Natural Sciences, (the right to educate its own 
doctorates), one part was saved for pension schemes and one part was allo-
cated to the development of the island Varvsholmen. 
5. Uddevalla 
The shipyard closed in 1986 which has been mentioned earlier. This major 
shipyard with a central location in the coastal city got its first new establish-
ment with the new Volvo car plant in 1986 built for a capacity of 40,000 cars. 
The plant, however, was short-lived as it was closed in 1993.  
When the formal decision was taken by Volvo in Gothenburg a hard fight 
arose between Uddevalla and Kalmar, firstly, in regard to which plant was to 
be closed last as both thought it would give the other one a second chance.  
Secondly, a parallel discussion took place between the two over the possi-
bility that Volvo was planning for a new car model together with the British 
company Wilkinson. The idea was a small cabriolet. Uddevalla was preferred 
as a location because of logistics and the close relations to the car industry 
complex in West Sweden.  
Speaking of Uddevalla, it must be mentioned, that it is one of three small 
towns working together, Trollhättan with SAAB and Volvo Aero, Vänersborg, 
the administrative centre and Uddevalla. The three towns have a common uni-
versity college which has among other programs specialized in engineering. 
The new factory, however small, has survived but the whole region was 
later shaken by the discussions concerning the future of SAAB. The Swedish 
government has taken part in the discussions with the former owner GM and 
its choice between Trollhättan and Rüsselsheim in Germany. The Government  
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re-allocated money from the national investment plan for roads and infrastruc-
ture to support Trollhättan and later also took part in the discussions between 
GM and Spyker concerning the loans from the European Bank. There are still 
a number of questions in the air about the durability of SAAB but the recent 
agreement between SAAB and BMW have increased the expectations. 
The huge shipyard area still offers options for new investments which will 
take some time to exploit. 
6. Landskrona 
The big shipyard was a very important part of the town’s industrial structure 
and the small town suffered relatively hard from the change. The shipyard has 
survived as a repair and sheer-metal shop but on a significantly lower level. 
The town has an excellent location between Malmö and Helsingborg but 
has still not been able to make use of it. The rapid close down of the big ship-
yard caused a lot of empty flats and problems for the local housing company 
and the economy of the city. The housing problem was partly solved by offer-
ing immigrants (refugees) a home. 
This has however created a new situation when Sverigedemokraterna (the 
Sweden Democrats), with a stronghold in the most southern province of Swe-
den, Skåne, was represented in many local parliaments in the election 2006 
and Landskrona became its major focal point.  
The former neo-nazist movement has gone through a major change of its 
political program and has succeeded to make it popular to a broader public. Its 
main focus is criticism of the Swedish immigration system and demands on 
more law and order. The party has now made it all the way to the Swedish 
Parliament in the election 2010. 
7. Oskarshamn 
This shipyard has followed a similar path as Landskrona as the new construc-
tion stopped first in 1982, a new attempt was then closed in 1995 and since 
then the shipyard is a repair shop.  
Oskarshamn as a city, however, has been able to meet the downgrading of 
the shipyard by new developments in the nuclear plant industry (one of Swe-
den’s three plants is located in the community) especially for taking care of 
the nuclear fuel waste. The so called intermediary stock, waste embedded in 
copper capsules, is located in Oskarshamn.  
The development of the harbour area was for many years stopped because 
of the discussion in Sweden where the final storage of nuclear waste would be. 
The fight finally was between Forsmark nuclear power plant north of Stock-
holm and Oskarshamn. In spring 2010 it was decided that the plant, or rather 
deep mines, would be located in Forsmark.  
Oskarshamn was promised some compensation in the nuclear area and 
money to develop the infrastructure. This means new options to think strategi-
cally concerning the harbour area.   
 
25
8. Other shipyards 
Falkenberg closed in 1987 and has also continued as a repair shop. 
Gävle closed in the 1960’s, the area has been slowly exploited for housing 
and some office buildings. 
Helsingborg closed in 1966 and has developed a logistic centre and a very 
nice housing complex. Helsingborg managed to use the new situation to be 
one of the leading logistic centres in Sweden. The coastline has been used to 
build a nice housing block that has been considered as a very good example of 
Swedish housing with a fantastic view over Öresund to Elsinore.  
Finnboda, 1979, in Stockholm had a very different history. Stockholm has 
always a lack of central land and the capital city of Sweden is developing fast. 
In the fight for survival of Finnboda there was never a strong local support and 
there is nothing similar to Gothenburg and Malmö which will be discussed 
later. Finnboda was seen as an époque that had ended and not as a disaster for 
Stockholm. 
9. Malmö 
The third biggest city-region in Sweden was seen as an industrial region up to 
the crisis in 1991-1994. The shipyard Kockums was an important part of this 
structure as Kockums also had other products like railway wagons, wind 
power towers, oil-platforms etc. and a very competitive engineering basis. The 
crane was the landmark of Malmö.  
The last commercial ship to leave Kockums was already in 1987 but at the 
same time they managed to take an order of submarines from the Australian 
government that offered a possibility to survive up to 1998. Kockums in 
Malmö also owned the shipyard in Karlskrona which gradually took over the 
production of other marine products like the surface combat ship Smyge 
(stealthy) with a very low exposure to radar.  
The city of Malmö, now facing a tough change, was promised help from the 
state by locating a SAAB factory to the Kockums premises and an industrial 
hall was actually built but never used. 
Three other things helped to make a special change in the outlook for 
Malmö. 
The first thing was the start of Malmö University College in 1997. This 
University was one of the last two to be started in Sweden, together with 
Södertörn in the southern part of Stockholm. Both were the result of a national 
intension to find ways to attract new categories to higher studies like workers 
and immigrants. Malmö had as a traditional industrial town a high proportion 
of workers but had also got a high proportion of immigrants. 
The university was thus seen as a tool to change the structure of the labour 
market. 
This new university had a successful start and has now 20,000 students. In 
the same city-region is Lund University located, one of the best and oldest in  
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Sweden. They had had problems to attract the categories mentioned above 
from Malmö and to offer the programs needed.  
There were of course some parts of Lund University already existing in 
Malmö like the School of Education, some programs for Engineering etc. but 
the new University managed to offer a much more complete solution. 
The new university was offered premises on the Kockums area and today 
all the major university buildings are on that area including a brand new li-
brary overlooking the old ferry harbour to Copenhagen. 
Discussions over a science park also started in the 1990s using a part of the 
Kockums facilities together with a real estate company and Malmö joined the 
Soft Center movement. However, the results of the co-operation with the real 
estate company turned out to be more of an office block than a science park. 
The city then changed its strategy and started MINC (Malmö Incubator) which 
also got old facilities in the Kockums area but now with a strong emphasis on 
starting new companies in close co-operation with the new university. 
The big change was however housing. In Sweden there is a tradition called 
BO (living) where every year one city is selected to show up its new buildings 
in order to offer some insight to and debate on Swedish building concepts. 
This movement is supported by the Swedish Planning Agency, Boverket.  
Malmö was chosen in 2001 and the exposition was called BO 01. (As a re-
mark Helsingborg harbour development was an earlier BO city) 
BO 01 was a success, built highly on Kockum’s ground, with its near access 
to the city centre and with a view on the water (Öresund) and of course Co-
penhagen, The new flagship or landmark of Malmö, when the Kockums Crane 
from 1974 finally was torn down, was “Turning Torso”, a multi-storey house 
with flats for people who looked for a “room with a view”. 
The SAAB plant could be used as premises for Malmö Fair and step by step 
the heavy industries are leaving the area for example the railway wagons and 
wind-power towers to Trelleborg, a nearby town.  
The second important step that must be mentioned is of course the building 
of the Öresundbridge. That has been discussed over a long time (like Feh-
marn) and in the South Sweden document “Vision for South Sweden” in 1994 
it was seen to be of major importance for Malmö, Skåne and all of South Swe-
den.  
There was opposition to the bridge from the Green party but also the Centre 
Party and caused no enthusiasm in Stockholm but finally the decision was 
taken and the bridge was opened in 2000. (A small notice, the steel pillars in 
the bridge were delivered by Kockum shipyard in Karlskrona). 
The bridge has certainly made Malmö a part of greater Copenhagen and the 
integration is going on, slowly but significantly. A few examples, there are a 
lot of Danish people moving to Malmö because the housing is cheaper, a lot of 
young Swedes are finding jobs in the Copenhagen service sector and there are 
many, from both sides, going shopping to the other side and finally Copenha- 
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gen has a lot to offer culturally. 
The third step is also a huge investment, building an underground railway 
through Malmö to the bridge. The present railway station is a dead-end and 
the new line opens up for more traffic and will make Malmö the hub of South 
Sweden and help to integrate it with Copenhagen. 
In connection with the forthcoming Fehmarn-bridge, which was also men-
tioned and hoped for in the Vision for South Sweden, this will increase the 
possibilities to increase the trade between Öresund region and Hamburg and 
connect to Europe in the age of the rapid trains. 
Malmö can no longer be seen as an industrial town but more as a part of 
Copenhagen or the Öresund region as the Malmö people prefer to say. The re-
gion Skåne has, since the 1990s, been given more power to steer its own 
course. That is an important factor when one looks ahead. 
The engineering skills of Kockums are still there, the Maritime school has 
become specialized on an international market and there is definitely a new 
belief in the future that is shown in the increasing prices on housing. 
10. Karlskrona 
Karlskrona has since the county Blekinge became Swedish in 1658 been of 
outmost importance for the Swedish navy as it is more ice-free than Stock-
holm and less vulnerable than Gothenburg (especially in the old times). 
Karlskrona shipyard is the only remaining construction shipyard of some 
importance and is building combat ships for the navy, both submarines and 
surface vessels. 
Celsius, the Swedish State Defence company, sold out Kockums to HDW in 
Kiel. HDW is partly owned by American “One Equity Group”. This has made 
the decision-making relatively difficult as most of the products have military 
significance both in Kiel and in Karlskrona. 
The naval shipyard has a central role in the city but today there are fewer 
restrictions concerning the military areas which have made it possible for the 
city to exploit coastal areas.  
The city also had a BO area on historic ground (Stumholmen), got a new 
university college in 1990 to help the city to meet the challenges from a reduc-
tion of military employees. The  
University is called Blekinge University of Technology with a strong em-
phasis on technology not least IT. 
The city also received a location of a heavy industry, Uddcomb, which was 
built in a completely new industrial area in the harbour. The industry closed 
down and the city first tried to use the area for the new University College but 
later developed it as a ferry-terminal for the line between southeast of Sweden 
and northeast of Poland. 
11. Gothenburg (Göteborg) 
West Sweden is the heartland of the Swedish shipbuilding industry and is also  
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a strong industrial area including Volvo, SAAB, SKF, and many more. 
Gothenburg is the major city in the region, Västra Götaland, which has the 
same strong position in Sweden as Skåne with its own regional development 
money and a strong influence nationally. Västra Götaland has 1.5 million in-
habitants and is the second region in Sweden as Gothenburg is also the second 
biggest city. 
Gothenburg has had a special spirit of co-operation between the city and the 
bigger companies like the shipbuilding ones. Gothenburg has also by tradition 
been very international as the major Swedish export harbour and with close 
links to the North Sea while Stockholm as the national capital has more of 
state administration and is also more Baltic Sea oriented (around 1900, it had 
strong links to St Petersburg and now of course Finland). 
The University of Technology, Chalmers, was one of two universities in 
Sweden that were given a freer position as foundations while the other univer-
sities are state authorities. As an example Chalmers has managed to have 
stronger links with the surrounding society than the Royal Institute of Tech-
nology in Stockholm (KTH). 
The ship-owners and ship-builders have always taken a great part in the city 
dialogue and so have people from Volvo and other major industries. At the 
same time it is worth mentioning that Gothenburg has been a stronghold for 
Socialdemokraterna (Labour), like in Malmö, while Stockholm is the strong-
hold of Moderaterna (Tories). 
This co-operation between the politicians and important industrialists is im-
portant to understand when one studies the development of Gothenburg after 
the ship-yard crisis.  
The development of the harbour and the ship-yard areas have a lot of ingre-
dients common to the ones discussed in Malmö and Kalmar. 
The river area is very attractive for housing. The international trend that 
started in Baltimore, US has been followed by HafenCity in Hamburg, the 
Docklands in London etc.  
As this is an international trend, widely exposed in media and magazines it 
has been possible to convince people that a flat close to the sea or river is a 
fantastic location even if, for a long time, it will be located in an area under 
construction. 
The “Project Lindholmen AB” started in 1976, two years after the shipyard 
was finally closed, and was later, in 1981, taken over by the city of Gothen-
burg. In 1983 an establishment for off-shore safety was built and 1988 the 
planning for a knowledge centre started. 
In 1991 a new school for Chalmers Engineering and School of Navigation 
was built. (A small remark is that Sweden in the 1970s had five schools for 
navigation showing the great historic importance of the Swedish Shipping in-
dustry. But in the 1970s two were closed, Stockholm and Härnösand and the 
one in Malmö had to specialize in international upgrading courses only).The  
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only remaining ones are in Gothenburg and Kalmar. 
The old Lindholmen shipyard with its very special location in the middle of 
the city could be rebuilt very successfully to a knowledge base for engineering 
courses thanks to co-operation with Chalmers University of Technology. 
The other shipyard areas on the north side of the river have been trans-
formed to housing areas with some office blocks. On the south side of the 
river the new Opera house was built as a part of opening up the river to the 
people. The Arendal shipyard is however further from the city centre and parts 
of it have so far been used by industries like Volvo. 
A small history of pride from the old areas is the building of a replica of a 
ship belonging to the Swedish East Indian company that became a wreck in 
the harbour coming home from its journey to China. The replica was launched 
at the north side of the river and has made a successful journey to Guangzhou 
and Shanghai in China in 2006. 
12. Conclusions 
As can be seen from the examples above, where Kalmar and Malmö have been 
looked upon in more details, they show a similar history. 
The international trend is clear: 
-  the Western society is going from an industrial society to a knowledge 
based society. 
-  it is more interesting today to live in the harbour areas which for a long time 
were seen  as ugly and noisy. 
Where there has been a redevelopment of these city areas both trends have 
been possible to combine to shape the new face of the city while using this 
empty land that has been demolished or seen as unattractive with ultramodern 
houses and offices. 
The change has of course both winners and losers. The winners have been 
those people that have been able to see the new opportunities in the service 
sector and the new housing possibilities. 
The losers are the people who were employed in the heavy industries and 
have not been able to switch to the new jobs because of age or lack of compe-
tence. For some people this has been a disaster, for instance when the Volvo 
plant closed 1994 in Kalmar 200 out of 800 have never succeeded to come 
back to the labour market while in comparison it happened to 50 out of 500 
when the Bombardier closed its railway wagon factory in 2005.  
The Volvo plant of course closed in the worst industrial crisis in Sweden 
while the Bombardier closed at a much better situation.  
A great difference was, however, that the Volvo plant was a pure produc-
tion line while the Bombardier plant also had a relatively big pool of experts. 
The closing of the shipyard in Kalmar, however painful for the workers, 
was a relatively small part of the labour market while the same occurences in 
Landskrona and Uddevalla were of major significance.  
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Malmö had a great opportunity to change from an industrial town to a 
knowledge based one and could also do it by strategic national investments 
like Öresund bridge, the underground railway and the new university.  
Västra Götaland has been supported by a huge national infrastructural pro-
gram and the region was large enough to cope with most of its problem within 
a given structure. But it is also true to say that both Gothenburg and Malmö 
have lost relatively in comparison with Stockholm. 
It is important to mention and stress that it is up to the city, too, to make 
these arrangements and take the lead. A close co-operation between leading 
politicians and business leaders is of outmost importance. In both Skåne and 
Västra Götaland the new regions had more muscles to do regional efforts and 
needed not to depend solely on Stockholm.  
The final question has never been answered, however, how long would the 
public sector support the losing companies/sectors in a structural change to 
make it possible to find new solutions. This is a million dollar question, bal-
ancing the winners and losers, it differs in times of boom or depression, differs 
in big and small regions and of course in the views of the losers and winners. 
In 1984 I had a discussion with Professor John Goddard at Newcastle Uni-
versity and director of CURDS, an analysing group at the University. CURDS 
had done a lot of studies of the change of the Newcastle area and other similar 
areas in Europe. He thought that it is fruitful to help companies in a structural 
change as long as there are some fresh parts in the company to be able to give 
time for helping the employees to new chances. 
Things that the states, regions and cities can do are: 
-  to support the unemployed as quick as possible,  
-  to help build networks,  
-  to support initiatives  
-  to engage/force the companies to make them take their own responsibility. 
The state can support through its mechanisms like education schemes and in 
some cases build a better infrastructure, 
The cities must take the lead in finding new solutions, in close co-operation 
with new investors. Those can be real estate agents in housing and compa-
nies/directors willing to support new tools like incubators and science parks. 
These latter can often be seen as costly in the short run but there are few other 
alternatives to smart innovations if the Baltic Sea Region is to still be competi-
tive with China and India. 
The swift of shipyards from Sweden to Japan has then gone further from 
Japan to Korea and now to China. These changes will occur in other sectors 
and it is necessary to learn about them to be able to handle the changes swiftly 
and with great emphasis. All the time, people need to climb the competence 
ladder, but and at the same time, be aware that they leave no one behind. 
One of the last examples will be an interview with Michael Chang, vice di-
rector of Ericsson in China, who made his doctorate at KTH in Stockholm. On  
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the question in Beijing 2001, what Swedes are good at, he responded, “you are 
good at thinking and working in systems – but you need to be quicker”. 
The final conclusion therefore is, the learning from each other in the Baltic 
Sea Region must be increased, the co-operating must be improved and people 
must follow and learn more about what is happening in China and India. They 
are already challenging European countries and China is allocating more 
money to R&D than Italy and other South-European countries.  
The author assumes the Nordic countries and Germany are strong enough to 
meet this challenge. The Chinese know this too and that is why they are so ea-
ger to share technologies with North Europeans and to know how they are 
working. In an ongoing project called “Transfer Technology Center” between 
the Baltic Sea Region and the Yangtse River Delta they are trying to tackle 
these questions. 
Maybe naively assumed, the author thinks that the Chinese are clever 
enough to copy products but they will have greater problems to copy the way 
of thinking and working in systems of Europeans.  
However, these things are changing too. Three years back, Chinese Compa-
nies still thought that courses on innovation were not necessary in MBA stud-
ies but now they are demanding it. 
In 2004 Geely was asked to make a bid on Volvo but they said they were 
not competent enough. 2010 they obviously think they are. 
Now other European countries have the task to make their coastal cities 
more attractive for the future. They should not look back to much of what was 
described of Sweden, they need to find their own new and challenging ways. 
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Regional Networks as Success Factor in Structural Change of Maritime 
Industry – The European Experience 
The maritime industry in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is situated in the middle 
of a turbulent period since the start of the financial and economic crisis in 
2008. Whereas the field of maritime logistics started to recover from the be-
ginning of 2010 the maritime industry is still facing times with low business 
activities. This bears especially for the economy of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern a special challenge because the shipbuilding sector is still the 
industrial backbone of the region, usually being responsible for approx. 20% 
of the regional industrial turnover, more than 350 maritime companies and 
approx. 12% of all industrial work places representing more than 13,000 jobs.  
Already before the crisis the shipbuilding sector in Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern was revealing some strategic weak points which were well 
known to insiders but which were hidden until the economic crisis put the re-
ality to light. Some of these weak points were related to management deci-
sions including the product portfolio but other reasons for the existing weak 
points were more related to the special situation appearing in transition 
economies. Like in all countries in Central Eastern Europe, Eastern Germany 
also had to pass a long transition process from a communist to a capitalist sys-
tem with a lot of consequences on the business structures. Despite the fact that 
the shipbuilding sector has been able to be kept in the transition phase as one 
of the few successful industrial clusters in Eastern Germany there are still a lot 
of features which are characteristic for transition economies.  
This paper will concentrate on the situation in the shipbuilding sector in the 
North-Eastern part of Germany, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 20 years after re-
unification. In general by comparing the business structures between Western 
and Eastern Germany it has to be stated that there is still a lack of big compa-
nies and industrial clusters in the East, so its business structures are mainly 
dominated by SME or networks of SME. These specifics of networking and 
cluster building in Eastern Europe have been the topic of a lot of studies where 
Wismar University took part in several national and European projects with 
focus on European SME structures around the Baltic Sea Region. This paper 
will mention the most important results related to shipbuilding.  
I. The German Maritime Sector 
Before the financial and economic crisis the German maritime economy 
counted more than 380,000 employees and generated a total turnover of more 
than 48 bn €. The German commercial fleet has the second place in the world 
(2007: 3,281 ships) and when it comes to container vessels Germany is con-
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trolling the largest fleet worldwide with approx. 1,400 containerships repre-
senting a market share of approx. 37%. Germany is representing one of the 
largest and most successful locations for maritime activities with 380 shipping 
companies and its maritime industry is one of the most important and most 
progressive sectors in Germany. 
 
Due to its high quality and innovative products in shipbuilding the German 
shipyards and the maritime supply companies are taking the fourth place in 
global shipbuilding with a total turnover of approx. 17 bn € and more than 
100,000 employees in shipbuilding sector. The German yards delivered 2,5% 
gt and 3,2% cgt of the shipbuilding production worldwide with an export rate 
of 60%. German shipbuilding supply companies are number 2 behind Japan 
with an export rate of 2/3.  
A closer look at the employment in German shipbuilding reveals that 
approx. 20 - 24% of the workplaces in shipbuilding sector are inside the Ger-
man yards where 90% of the employees are working in shipbuilding sector 
whereas 10% of the workplaces are in ship repair. According to the informa-
tion of IG Metall Küste (workers union) 50 % of new work contracts are tem-
porary and that 10 – 15% of the employees in shipyards are loan workers. The 
biggest shipbuilding employers till 2007 were 
-  Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems  30 % 
-  Meyer Group  14 % 
-  Wadan Group  12 % 
A strategic consideration of German shipbuilding sector in form of a SWOT 




The situation in Western and Eastern shipbuilding is completely different be-
cause of the restructuring process after the reunification in Eastern Germany 
where the whole shipbuilding activities are concentrated in the region of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. An analysis of the consequences of the financial 
and economic crisis on the German shipbuilding yards is revealing the special 
Eastern German situation where more than half of the yards are currently in 




II. Maritime Industry in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (M-V), located between two of the largest cities in 
central Europe, Hamburg and Berlin, is Germany’s gateway to the Baltic 
North and North East with a growing importance as a hub for maritime traffic 
to and from Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, and overseas. The region is con-
nected to a number of important ports in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) through 
several ferry and shipping lines. Furthermore modern shipyards and their sup-
pliers, as well as port-related and maritime industries are some sectors domi-
nating the regional economy. Following figures illustrate the regional loca-




By taking a closer look at the maritime industry, i.e. the shipbuilding sector in 
M-V, it turns out that the shipbuilding sector is the only industrial kernel of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, being responsible for 20% of the total production 
turnover and for 12% for all regional industrial workplaces. The main activi-
ties in shipbuilding are located in the environment of the four main shipbuild-
ing destinations of Wismar, Rostock, Stralsund and Wolgast. By summing up 
only the jobs related to the shipbuilding yards the number is reaching approx. 
6,000 employees, consisting of approx. 5,000 employees and approx. 1,000 
loan workers and representing approx. 25% of all German shipyard employ-
ees.  
The total number of ships build in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in 2007 were 
28 ships with a total turnover of more than 1 bn € representing approx. 30% of 
German total turnover in shipbuilding sector. How important the shipbuilding 
sector is for the cities mentioned above can be considered in the following 




By analysing the structure of the product portfolio of the shipbuilding sector it 
turns out that the shipyards in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern produced 38% of 
the total German cgt in shipbuilding but the corresponding turnover was only 
28% in 2007 revealing that M-V yards are producing ships with 75% of the 
German average value for a ship. This fact is not very surprisingly because the 
main products from M-V yards are container ships which are representing low 
value products in shipbuilding and where Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is re-
sponsible for 43% of all German built containerships. The increasing impor-





This chart explains the development of the production portfolio of the M-V 
shipyards from 1990 to 2005 expressing the decrease of the average cgt – co-
efficient of all built ships till recent times where nearly 100% containerships 
were produced.  
The reasons for this degeneration of the production portfolio were mainly 
caused by the approx. 20% lower salaries for shipbuilding workers in Eastern 
Germany together with the newly constructed modern shipbuilding yards 
(compact yards; after 1990) which were designed for mass construction with a 




But even these efficiency considerations were not enough to keep the German 
containership production competitive against the Asian yards. Still in the peak 
times in container orders in 2006 the price for a container ship from Mecklen-
burg-Vorpommern was approx. 30% higher than the price for a container ship 
from Asia. And since 60% of the container ships were exported from Germany 
the price level was a permanent disadvantage for the M-V yards leading to an 
economic disaster in times of the starting financial and economic crisis where 
nearly no more new ships were ordered.  
This productivity disadvantage of the German container ship production 
was linked in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern with a structural disadvantage in the 
maritime supply sector. It is well known that there is not a real return in ship-
yard operations so most of the yards are operating with profitability around 
zero. The economic more interesting sector is represented by the maritime 
supply companies which are more profitable than yards and which are enjoy-
ing an export rate of approx. 2/3. However, unfortunately, only 2% of all 
German maritime supply companies are located in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
even though more than 25% of the German shipbuilding production is concen-
trated in the German North-East expressing that not enough shipbuilding prof-
its are kept in M-V related to the production capacity. This represents a real 
strategic disadvantage because by keeping in mind that in Germany approx. 
100,000 employees are working in shipbuilding sector but only approx. 25% 
are employed in shipyards revealing the huge potential for workplaces and ad-
ditional profits in a growing maritime supply sector.   
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III. Soft factors in Eastern Germany 
However, before focussing on the maritime networks it is necessary to under-
stand the socio-economic background of Eastern Germany. In this context it is 
important to mention that even 20 years after the reunification significant dif-
ferences in the economy between Western and Eastern Germany exist. So it 
must be stated that the Eastern productivity reaches still only about 80 % of 
the Western productivity whereas the Eastern level of salaries is 90 % of the 
Western salaries.  
Furthermore, there are also differences in the number and size of the com-
panies. In average, there are less and smaller companies in the East, which is 
due to the fact that the majority of the big Eastern companies collapsed after 
reunification due to the quick privatisation process in the transition period af-
ter 1990 and together with the implosion of the traditional big enterprises also 
a lot of the connected clusters vanished throughout the East. Because of the 
lack of new cluster kernels, the enterprise structure in Eastern Germany can 
still be characterized as a tissue or network of SMEs, comparable to nearly all 
parts of Eastern Europe.  
In 2005 Wismar University and the Chamber of Commerce in Schwerin 
launched a regional survey on international activities of SME’s. Over 1,500 
companies in the region of West-Mecklenburg - around Wismar and Schwerin 
- were surveyed with the majority of manufacturing and service companies 
participating in the survey [BP1]. The region West-Mecklenburg is character-
ized by a dominating SME sector where nearly 50% of the companies are mi-
cro-firms. Thus, expectedly, only less than 10% of all regional turnovers are 
generated by international operations. Nevertheless, from nearly one third of 
all companies that showed export turnovers about half of those export active 
companies were able to generate only up to 10 % of their total turnover from 
export activities (Median: 12,5%). As a reason for this weak performance in 
international operations, the SME leaders pointed out insufficient language 
and intercultural skills to participate in foreign activities.  
One of the important side effects of this consideration about the privatisa-
tion process is that the spin-off companies were organised according to the 
East German tradition, mainly in a hierarchical form of organisation. Because 
organisational principles, like transparency, openness and trust, represented 
underdeveloped values during the former GDR days, it is problematic for 
these companies to integrate younger and highly qualified people endangering 
the renewing process in the field of human capital.  
Other results like the empiric studies of the Institute of Sociology of the 
Friedrich-Schiller-University of Jena, known as the “Jena Study”, lead by 
Rudi Schmidt analyzed 749 SME‘s in a permanent panel from both parts of 
Germany and the researchers found out remarkable differences between both 
management cultures [MMS]. The most important results were:  
-  only 10 % of the “East” CEO‘s is younger than 40,  
 
42 
-  94 % of the “East” CEO‘s have academic degree, 
-  the majority of the “East” CEO’s are engineers, 
-  the majority of “West” CEO’s have a Business Administration background, 
-  both parts of Germany are preferring a cooperative management style, 
-  Eastern management style is rather authoritarian and capitalistic. 
All these results together revealed substantial lacks in soft skills in large parts 
of Eastern German business sector. Some of the crucial soft gaps which could 
be improved by business-oriented education shall be mentioned here: 
-  Underdeveloped international and intercultural skills, 
-  Hierarchic and inflexible organisational structures, 
-  Weak networking activities, 
-  Weakness in innovation. 
Based on these and other observations of existing mentality differences be-
tween East and the West, Wölf and Ragnitz have worked out a study about 
networking and cluster structures in East and West Germany where they found 
out that the networking activities and cluster structures in the East are less de-
veloped than in the West [WR]. 
IV. Networking and Trust 
Trust plays a mayor role in business theories about networking and cluster 
building. In transaction costs theory a direct explanation is given how to un-
derstand the linkage between organisational structures, stating that the lesser 
the trust in a socio-economic system, the more formal structures are required 
in organisation and cooperation. Also, game theory is leading to the conclu-
sion that on the long run all parties’ interests are best achieved by a social en-
vironment which is as transparent as possible and favours cooperation, recip-
rocity and trust [AK]. 
Already a first view on the trust situation within the BSR is revealing dif-
ferences not only throughout the area but also between the Western countries 
and the new Eastern countries. As an indicator for the social trust the results 
from the World Value Survey and the European Social Survey [WVS/ESS] 
are taken where social trust is defined as a percentage of the population in a 
country agreeing with the question that “Most people can be trusted”. The 
characteristic values showing the trust situation in the Baltic Sea Region 
(BSR) can be found in the following table:  
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The table is showing that the level of social trust is around 60% in the Nordic 
states and about 20% in the Eastern countries around the BSR. The European 
average for the Western countries is around 43% whereas 24% for the Eastern 
countries show that already the differences of trust levels inside Europe are 
remarkable high. Germany as a cultural transition area between East and West 
is enjoying the difference between its Eastern and Western part with 37% in 
the West and 28% in the East [VD].  
V. Example: The Logistics-Network in Seaport Rostock 
The networking study of Wölf and Ragnitz represented a starting point for a 
regional study at Wismar University about the situation in the seaport cluster 
of Rostock [PR]. Rostock seaport has been historically the kernel of a mari-
time cluster with a big number of enterprises and employees working mainly 
in the environment of logistics. After the German reunification in 1990, this 
seaport cluster was restructured where the development can be regarded in the 
following figures: 
  1989 1994 1998 2005
Compa- 30  217 168 181 
Employ- 10.500 7261 4443 5472 
The structure of the companies in the seaport cluster changed from a smaller 
number of large enterprises during the GDR time to a bigger number of 
smaller companies in recent days. This is expressed by the average number of 
employees per company which dropped from approx. 350 in 1989 to approx. 
30 in 2005. A number of analyses about the structure of companies and em-
ployees have been made by Rostock University and Wismar University and 
some important results of an actual analysis can be found in [BP2]. 
The number of possible factors influencing the performance of clusters is 
immense. Furthermore, the performance of companies inside a cluster can 
only be understood when their embeddedness is taken into account. The most  
 
44 
complete measure for the performance of clusters is the value added generated 
in the cluster. The value added generated in the cluster is the sum of the value 
added generated by the members of the population.  
One important approach for measuring the performance of clusters was de-
veloped by Peter De Langen [DL] based on the consideration of a set of 8 
variables influencing the performance of a seaport cluster where 4 are focus-
ing on the cluster structure and the other 4 are describing cluster governance: 
I. Cluster structure 
Element of cluster struc-
ture 
Effect on cluster performance 
Agglomeration economies 
 
-  A shared labour pool attracts firms to the cluster. 
-  The presence of customers and suppliers attracts firms 
to the cluster. 
-  The presence of knowledge (spill-over) attracts firms to 
the cluster. 
-  Land scarcity and high land prices ‘disperse’ firms from 
the cluster. 
-  Congestion disperses firms from the cluster. 
Internal competition 
 
-  Internal competition prevents monopoly pricing. 
-  Internal competition leads to specialization. 
-  Internal competition promotes innovation. 
Cluster barriers 
 
-  Entry barriers (such as inaccessible networks) and start-
up barriers (such as non-availability of local venture 
capital) reduce competitive pressure and prevent the in-
flow of (human) capital. 
-  Exit barriers (such as ‘sticky labour’ and cluster spe-




-  Cluster heterogeneity enhances opportunities for inno-
vation. 
-  Cluster heterogeneity enhances opportunities for coop-
eration. 





II. Cluster governance 
Elements of cluster governance  Effects on cluster performance 
The presence of Trust  -  Trust lowers coordination costs because 
costs to specify contracts decrease. 
-  Trust increases the scope of coordination 
beyond price, because the risk of free rid-
ing decreases. 
The presence of intermediaries 
 
-  Intermediaries lower coordination costs 
and increase the scope of coordination be-
yond price because they specialize in 
managing coordination. 
The presence of leader firms  -  Leader firms generate positive external 
effects for firms in their network, mainly 
by encouraging innovation and promoting 
internationalization. 
-  Leader firms generate positive external 
effects for firms in the cluster, mainly by 
organizing investments in the training and 
education infrastructure, the innovation 
infrastructure and the infrastructure for 
collective action. 
Quality of collective action regimes 
 
-  The more resources are invested in collec-
tive action regimes, the better the per-
formance of a cluster. Five variables in-
fluence the amount of invested resources: 
-  role of leader firms,  
-  role of public organizations,  
-  presence of an infrastructure for collec-
tive action, the presence of a commu-
nity argument  
-  use of voice. 
By using the analytical framework of De Langen and applying it to the 
Rostock seaport cluster it is revealed that nearly all of them belong to the lo-
gistics-related sector, outlining that the seaport cluster can be considered as a 
service cluster. The analysis of the 8 structural variables of the Rostock sea-
port cluster revealed a picture of the strengths and weaknesses [P1]: 
I. Cluster structure  
a. Strength of Rostock Seaport Cluster 
1. Strong potential of working power 
2. High transportation volume  
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3. Low rent and real estate prices 
b. Weakness of Rostock Seaport Cluster 
1. Low variety of goods 
2. Low variety in cluster population 
3. Low presence of customers and suppliers 
A surprising observation of the results of the study was that knowledge spill-
over effects inside the cluster have been regarded as relatively unimportant 
showing together with the weaknesses in the variety of goods and in the clus-
ter population a strategic disadvantage in the area of innovations of the cluster. 
The high ranking of the available working power, high transportation volumes 
and low land prices are revealing an emphasis on operating topics in the per-
ception of the cluster companies.  
II. Cluster governance  
a. Strength of Rostock Seaport Cluster 
1. Presence of intermediaries 
2. High quality in common problem solving  
b. Weakness of Rostock Seaport Cluster 
1. Low trust among cluster companies 
2. Existence of central actors  
The stated strengths in the Rostock Seaport Cluster are focusing on the freight 
forwarders and brokers who are generating and distributing service tasks 
among the cluster companies. These intermediaries are competent and there is 
a high quality in problem solving inside the cluster. However, these mentioned 
strengths are emphasising more the operational level of business activities. 
When it comes to the weaknesses inside the cluster, the existing low level of 
trust reveals a strategic problem for the future cluster development. Concern-
ing the issue of trust, it was assessed that the actual level of trust inside the 
cluster was very low and, additionally, the importance of trust for the cluster 
development was regarded as low. This weak perception of trust as an impor-
tant cluster dimension is also expressed in the second weak point concerning 
the existence of central actors. In general, central actors like the port admini-
stration, are taking over the role of moderators between different cluster com-
panies and laying the ground for the common cluster activities and as such, 
they are fostering trust among the cluster population. So due to the absence of 
strong central actors inside the seaport cluster the soft dimensions are under-
developed indicating a strategic weakness of the whole cluster and represent-
ing an important threat for the future cluster development.  
VI. Example: Innovation Network: Logistics Cluster Wismar  
The national research project „Innovation Network: Logistics Region Wis-
mar“ was initiated in Summer 2008 by the Federal Ministry for Transport, 
Construction and Urban Development. Under the lead of Rostock University  
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and Wismar University the research project is aiming to promote and develop 
an integrative of maritime logistics network around the Wismar seaport by fo-
cussing on the following targets: 
-  Profiling of the logistics region Wismar, 
-  Implementation of an innovation network, 
-  Improving the networking activities around Wismar and linking them to the 
BSR. 
The target groups of this project are mainly logistics service providers and 
freight forwarders around Wismar with a focus on maritime logistics. After a 
couple of expert interviews focussing on logistics and ICT topics, the project 
was able to present the first results. By asking the logistics experts about the 
main obstacles for a stronger integration and better development of the re-
gional logistics network the following answers were given [P3]: 
Logistics 
 
-  Strong fragmentation inside the logistics network 
-  Nearly no ICT – integration 
-  Partitioning-off of the logistics executives of larger companies 
with company headquarters outside Wismar towards the regional 
logistics network 
-  Nearly no inter company communication  
-  Insufficient cooperation between the companies related to un-
derdeveloped regional networking skills 
ICT -  No common communication platform  
-  Lacking data security  
-  No need/request of ICT – networking between the partners  
-  Different company unique internet portals  
-  ICT – networking is no common target ( too expensive, too vul-
nerable and too heterogeneous ) 
-  No common strategic concept  
-  No real and historical grown cluster structures  
-  Orders are still processed traditionally so there are no common 
ICT – standards  
Already the first results of the expert interviews around Wismar Logistics 
network are revealing significant weaknesses in soft factors and strategic 
thinking. Both sides of the cluster building process, the economic and the ICT 
parts are suffering from under underdeveloped communication and the will of 
cooperation. The importance of data security and the strong fragmentation top-
ics inside the potential logistics network are indicating again social trust as a 
crucial variable in the cluster building process.  
VII. Consequences and cases of successful networking activities  
a. Case: Logistics initiative Hamburg 
Hamburg is representing the German logistics capital with more than 5,000  
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classical logistics companies and approximately 150,000 employees in the lo-
gistics sector. By taking into account also the employees in the logistics ser-
vice sector like consultation, IT services and transport assurances, the number 
of employees in the larger metropolitan region of Hamburg even exceeds the 
number of 230,000 employees. This phenomenon is heavily driven by the de-
velopment of Hamburg seaport enjoying a steady annual growth rate of more 
than 10% till 2008. Since 2010 the economic situation at Hamburg harbour is 
recovering again and facing comparable figures like before the crisis.  
In order to strengthen the development of the logistics cluster in Hamburg 
region, the logistics initiative for Hamburg was founded in 2005 with the tar-
get to establish additional 14,000 new jobs in Hamburg and to generate an ad-
ditional value added in Hamburg of approx. 6 bn €. The forecast for the effects 
of the activities of the logistics initiative was based on the Regionomia study 
[RS].  
Three topics have been identified as main success factors for the further lo-
gistical development of Hamburg: 
1. free land for logistical operations, 
2. technical innovation projects in logistics, 
3. education and qualification in logistics. 
As an important bottleneck for the further development in the logistics sector, 
the study identified a lack of educational capacity in the Hamburg region since 
the increasing need of skilled workers and employees in logistics was threat-
ening the whole logistics sector in Hamburg. So the logistics initiative stressed 
heavily the expansion of logistical education and qualification in Hamburg. 
One important factor for the Hamburg region is the development of free 
land for logistical purposes since the high density in the Hamburg region leads 
to a permanent shortage of space. Under the precondition that the space prob-
lem will be solved in the next 10 years, the study is estimating the creation of 
approx. 700 new logistical jobs in the first year, and up to approx. 8,500 new 
logistics jobs till 2015. With an average gross value added per employee in lo-
gistics of approx. 55,000 € for the next 10 years, the total additional value 
added from new jobs in logistics was calculated to be approx. 3 bn €.  
The indirect effects of the logistical initiative have been estimated to be 3 % 
considering the following 3 topics: 
1. Effects from technology and innovation 
Estimated effect:  1 % per year  
New jobs:  approx. 500  
2. Effects due to education and qualification 
Estimated effect:  0.5 % per year  
New jobs:  ca. 500  
Additional VA:  80 million € 
3. Effects due to cooperation 
Estimated effect:  1.5 % per year   
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New jobs:  approx. 750  
Additional VA:  230 million € 
The most interesting result of this analysis is the relative high value of 1.5 % 
due to cooperation yielding the same total effect of innovation and education 
together. The study contained the important statement that the estimated ef-
fects of cooperation have been detected already empirically during the writing 
of the study. Altogether, the study estimated the total effect of the logistics ini-
tiative of Hamburg with 14,000 new jobs in direct and indirect logistical sec-
tors and an additional value added for Hamburg of approx. 6 bn €. Due to the 
appearance of the financial and economic crisis it is hard to evaluate how reli-
able the estimations have been. 
b. Case: Kompetenznetzwerke 
A second case that will be discussed here is the initiative “Kompetenznetze 
Deutschland” which was funded by the Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology (BMWi), gathering the most innovative, mainly industrial driven 
regional networks in Germany and supporting them in different areas. Mem-
bers of selected networks must fulfil specific requirements so that a strong col-
laborative development of technology, providence of added value for the 
members, good sustainability of the network, high innovation potential and 
strong international orientation must be safeguarded.  
In the meantime the total number of 107 networks was funded already 
where altogether more than 6,500 members cooperated consisting of approx. 
4,000 SMEs, 700 global companies and at least 1,300 R&D institutions and 
universities. These members were organised in three different types of cluster 
where approx. 70% of the networks were organised as “top down externally 




Investigations by Claas van der Linde based on the diamond approach of Por-
ter revealed that not only factor and demand conditions were the most impor-
tant reasons for sustainable cluster establishment but also “other reasons” like 
cluster management, cluster financing and the settings of an appropriate 
framework are influencing the cluster development. By analysing the cluster 
performance it turned out that already the type of network is influencing the 
performance: 
 
Furthermore the evaluation study revealed that bottom-up networks are much 
more internationalised than top down networks where the level of internation-
alisation is about twice as high for the bottom-up networks.  
Another important impact factor is representing the financing of the 
emerged networks. By taking a closer look at the financial sources for the 
competence networks it showed that in the average 78% of network financing 
came from public sources whereas 22% were based on private sources. The 
main sources are federal and federal state funding. This average value of pub-
lic funding decreases to 57% till 2007 for the considered networks where the 
share of federal-based funding of the networks decreased from 27% at the time 
of cluster emergence to 9 % in 2007. On the other side, the shares of EU fund-




There are, furthermore, remarkable differences in financing, depending on the 
type of network. Since bottom-up networks are usually based on local initia-
tives with a special involvement of private sector the degree of private financ-




The network performance is depending on the type of financing. The authors 
of the study classified the funding into four categories: 
-  Very critical financing:  < 6 months 
-  Critical financing:  6 – 12 months 
-  Sustainable financing:  12 – 24 month s 
-  Very sustainable financing: > 24 months. 
In the study it was asked to which type of financing the own network would 
belong with the result that 89% regarded the financing of their own network as 
sustainable whereas 21% were considering their network financing as critical. 
How high the influence for the type of financing is on the network perform-
ance can be seen in the following diagram: 
 
As a conclusion of the performance analysis of the competence networks in 
Germany the following results can be formulated: 
-  Top down, externally initiated clusters are the prevailing type of cluster 
emergence in Germany, 
-  Bottom-up clusters tend to be more internationalised than others, 
-  Federal state based funding of clusters last longer than regional funding, 
-  Sustainable financing seems to have significant impact on the development 
and performance of a cluster, 
-  The type of clusters emergence as well as the sustainability of financing of 
the clusters tend to have an impact on the output performance of clusters. 
Finally we want to refer to the most important future challenges by cluster 




VIII. Maritime Industry and Regional Development  
Until now the considerations have been focussed more on results from the lo-
gistics area. Now the regional development and networking situation in mari-
time industry will be more in the centre. In a European survey from 2005 the 
importance and the cooperation activities in the shipbuilding sector have been 
studied [TL]. The results of the survey stressed again the strong importance of 
the shipbuilding for the regional development of the involved regions. Espe-
cially the results for Germany showed that the socio-economic impact of the 
shipyards is crucial for their regions with a very high value of approx. 86%. 
One reason for this is that the yards are often structurally located in economi-
cally underdeveloped regions with a lack of comparable job opportunities. In 
the case of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern this situation applies for the whole re-
gion because, as already mentioned, the shipbuilding sector is representing the 




In order to better understand the cooperation structures in the shipbuilding 
sector it is helpful to consider the networking activities inside the sector. By 
eliminating the interaction between the shipyards and scientific institutions it 
turned out that there are big differences according to the type of shipyards. 
The most intensive cooperation takes place in naval shipbuilding, followed by 
merchant shipyards, whereas in the case of repair yards the cooperation with 




When it comes to the cooperation between yards and suppliers the situation 
looks totally different. This type of cooperation can be regarded as vertical co-
operation expressing more the hierarchical type of cooperation due to the ex-
isting business relations. This type of cooperation applies to the design proc-
ess, installation, mounting and putting into service. For all these types of 




A deeper form of cooperation is represented by joint working groups between 
yards and suppliers. One result of the survey was that there is a positive corre-
lation between the existence of such joint working groups and the complexity 
of ships built by the yard. This is the reason why in naval shipbuilding the 
value for existing joint working groups is the highest with 62%. In the field of 
merchant shipbuilding all yards involved in building passenger ships affirmed 
the existence of joint working groups. Even in the field of repair yards joint 
working groups can be found in approx. 50% of the cases.  
 
The analysis of working areas for joint working groups between yards and 
their suppliers shows that design/construction and manufacturing/installation 
are by far the most important fields for this form of cooperation. There are 
huge potentials in the field of process logistics because this area is underrepre-




The procurement and logistics field in shipbuilding has been identified also in 
other studies as an area with a huge rationalisation potential like shown in 
[TH]. When it comes to procurement strategies of yards the usual paradigm 
for supplier-customer relationships is still mostly the traditional confrontation 
model where long-term partnership and cooperation was often of secondary 
importance. For a long time the basis of the purchasing strategy was to en-
courage strong competition among many suppliers, combined with buying 
from several sources using short-term contracts. So operative and transaction 
oriented purchasing activities have dominated the purchasing departments in 
the European shipbuilding industry. This was especially true for mid-sized 
shipyards. A strategic approach in dealing with suppliers in the maritime in-
dustry – especially on the part of some larger shipyards – was only carried out 
in the last 10 to 15 years. Shipyards rarely use exactly the same suppliers for 
new shipbuilding projects. There are nearly no long-term contractual agree-
ments for exclusive supply making it possible to change suppliers on daily ba-
sis [TH]. Nevertheless new integration projects between suppliers in shipyards 
have been initiated in recent years especially in German shipbuilding. Studies 
and expert interviews revealed the advantage of supplier involvement in Ger-
man shipyards in cost improvement of more than 10%, a 20% reduction in cy-
cle time, approx. 40% reduction in development time together with an approx. 
15% higher quality. 
The traditional supplier structures in the European maritime industry are 
characterised by considerable time and effort spent on coordination, a low 
level of transparency and deterioration of efficiency due to friction. In particu-
lar, the coordination and traceability of change notifications as well as an in- 
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ter-company revision control prove a challenge to shipbuilding companies due 
to incompatible systems and processes. So it is not a big surprise that a deeper 
cooperation between suppliers and shipyards is connected with different opin-
ions on this topic mainly developed on experiences in the increased coopera-
tion process. A summary of the fundamental problem fields stated from the 
perspective of shipyards are according to [TH]: 
1. Suppliers  
-  Fear of dependency from suppliers, 
-  Blocking due to fear of know-how drain or diffusion of proprietary 
knowledge and the relinquishing of technologies, 
-  Fear of losing confidential financial information: Prevention of the in-
spection of cost and profit structures (especially disclosure of capacity 
utilisation figures and actual man hour particulars). 
2. Shipyard 
-  Exit barriers and dependency on command of technologies of the supplier 
/ lock-in in the supplier’s technologies, 
-  Missing process for the involvement of suppliers, 
-  Problems of in-company cooperation between purchasing and develop-
ment/production: Advantages cannot be sold internally (“not invented 
here” syndrome). 
3. Cooperation 
-  Language and cultural barriers as well as emotional problems in the de-
viation from traditional course of business, 
-  Initiation and implementation result in integration costs being too high 
(alternating control and coordination efforts; difficulties in measuring 
performance). 
4. Business and Regulatory Framework 
-  Unsettled legal implications and liability questions, 
-  Strongly fluctuating capacity figures of the maritime industry in general. 
A special topic is the cooperation between yards which can be considered as 
horizontal cooperation. As already mentioned in the evaluation of the experi-
ences of supplier/yard cooperation the mental and cultural differences are 
playing an important role for the success of the cooperation. These soft factors 
are even more crucial in horizontal cooperation than in the vertical case be-
cause shipyards are representing larger companies with their own traditions 
and working and management cultures. These cultural differences are increas-
ing significantly when it comes to horizontal cooperation between Western 
and Eastern yards. Some results on horizontal cooperation can be found again 




The areas of existing cooperation can be found in the next table. 
 
When it comes to the problems in cooperation it turns out that an incorrect 
execution of construction plans is of minor importance. The main problem 
fields are appearing in the fields of quality, time-related reliability, language 
problems and mentality differences stressing again the soft factors as crucial 




IX. Maritime Network in Germany  
In a special study the Northern German bank Nord/LG investigated the struc-
ture of the maritime network in Germany [NL]. The results are based on a sur-
vey about the cooperation relations among maritime institutions in Germany. 
The first chart is showing the situation in Northern Germany where it is visible 
that the center of maritime activities is located in Hamburg with a strong sub-
center located in Bremen area. All other destinations in Germany are consist-




It is quite interesting to notice that a lot of maritime activities are taking place 




In both charts the lines between two points are representing cooperation be-
tween two institutions which have been investigated by a special survey. In 
both charts it is visible that concerning Mecklenburg-Vorpommern the most 
important point on the map is Rostock where most points and most of the lines 
are meeting. But compared to all important Northern German maritime areas it 
shows that not only the cooperation relations are on a relatively low level but 
also the number of actors in maritime sector in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is 
relatively small, especially by keeping in mind that around 25% of shipbuild-
ing capacity is concentrated in this region. Here again the low number of mari-




The two presented charts do not give a hint how intensive the cooperation 
between the different actors in the maritime network is developed. This topic 
is visualised in the following graph:  
 
The chart is revealing a lot of important relationships concerning the coopera-
tion patterns in German maritime sector. So for example the high value sums 
between academic institutions and maritime technology, maritime supply 
companies and shipbuilding yards as well as the strong interaction between 
shipping companies and maritime service sector is not bearing a great surprise.  
More interesting is the high cooperation level (31% = 17% + 14%) between 
shipping companies and maritime supply companies stressing another weak 
point in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern because not only the number of maritime 
supply companies in the region is with approx. 2% by far too low but also the 
number of shipping companies in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is less than 3% 
of the total German value.  
X.  Consequences for the Maritime Industry in Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern  
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern has no explicit shipbuilding cluster organization 
like other regions in Baltic Sea Region coordinating the activities and actors in 
the region. There are two initiatives, MAO and MAZA in form of associations 
where MAO (Martime Allianz Ostseeregion, www.mao-ev.de) was founded as 
an interest and coordination association for a big maritime support and innova-
tion project from German federal level played a strong role during the project  
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time till 2006 but lost more or less its coordination power after the project 
time. MAZA-MV (Kooperationsverbund Maritime Zulieferer Allianz MV, 
www.maza-mv.de) is more an umbrella and networking association of the 
maritime supply companies located in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.  
Both organizations are rather representing a weak political and economic 
power and especially a view on the MAO web-pages reveals that after the end 
of national granted R&D projects the activity level heavily reduced. One rea-
son for this is that no substantial public financial support went into the ship-
building sector but the other main reason was that the headquarters of all im-
portant shipbuilding yards in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern were shifted out of 
the region so the representatives of the yards were remote controlled from out-
side Mecklenburg-Vorpommern reducing the regional engagement. The situa-
tion of MAZA was different because the member companies were mainly re-
gional SMEs with a strong linkage to the region but in comparison with the 
big shipyards they represented an association with a lower economic and po-
litical weight. Due to the low activity level in regional shipbuilding there are 
no significant activities of MAZA right now. Nevertheless it is important to 
mention that both MAO and MAZA are stressing their activities and links to 
off-shore renewable energy installations. 
By taking under consideration the discussed results the following recom-
mendations can be formulated: 
-  Cooperation and networking is generating strategic benefits, 
-  Successful cooperation and networking requires trust and transparency, 
-  Results of federal initiative “Kompetenznetze” shows that financial support 
and involvement of all regional key actors is necessary for sustainable suc-
cess of networking activities, 
-  Maritime cluster institution is necessary which is equipped with a sustain-
able financing, 
-  Internationalization of network activities is substantial for long term success 
of networks, 
-  Future in maritime industry for Europe is lying in high-tech products so 
strong involvement of maritime R&D and innovation sector is necessary, 
-  Integrated maritime institute for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, acting as a 
maritime cluster institution is recommendable, including all maritime indus-
trial activities like maritime innovation and technology, maritime logistics 
and safety as well as maritime economy. This maritime institute has the ad-
ditional task to formulate the regional needs in maritime industry due to the 
fact that the head quarters of the big shipbuilding yards are still outside 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.  
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Strategic Alliances in Maritime Industry - the Norwegian Experience 
Abstract 
Norwegian shipbuilding firms face problems related to the high level of com-
petition in the industry, uncertainty caused by industrial cyclicality, and high 
cost levels. This study provides fresh insights surrounding how interfirm co-
operative strategies selected by Norwegian shipbuilding firms can be lever-
aged to generate sustained competitive advantage. Advantages and disadvan-
tages of interfirm collaboration are analyzed. The data were collected from 
semi-structured interviews, reports, and Internet. The paper would be interest-
ing for practitioners and policy-makers seeking to improve competitiveness of 
national maritime firms.  
1. Introduction 
Analysis of previous studies (Benito et al., 2003; Hervik and Jakobsen, 2001; 
Wergeland, 1999) has revealed that there is a lacuna of research relating to in-
terfirm collaboration in the shipbuilding industry of Norway. These studies 
were general inquiries into shipbuilding in Norway, and they only briefly dis-
cussed the issues of interfirm collaboration. This study seeks to explore the 
phenomenon of interfirm collaboration in the context of the shipbuilding in-
dustry. The purpose of this research is to explore the strategies for interfirm 
collaboration reported by Norwegian shipbuilding firms. Presented evidence 
may be used by policy-makers and practitioners to guide their resource alloca-
tion decisions.  
Today, approximately thirty countries have major shipbuilding industrial 
complexes (Wijlnost et al., 1997). After 1975, the structure of the global ship-
building industry changed dramatically. The centre of the world shipbuilding 
is now Asia. Japan, South Korea, China, and India are now the leading ship-
builders in terms of production volume. Western European shipyards have 
downsized and reduced their production capacitates. They now employ fewer 
workers (Stopford, 1997). The market share generated by European shipyards 
has fallen from 49 per cent in 1977 to 23 per cent in 1995, and to 9 per cent in 
2006 (R S Platou Shipbrokers AS, 2007; Stopford, 1997, 2009). In Sweden, 
Denmark and Great Britain, many shipbuilding yards have disappeared. Yards 
have closed due to low price competition from Asian shipbuilding firms, as 
well as the withdrawal of Government subsidies to shipbuilding firms. Never-
theless, the European maritime industry is still a strong player. The industry 
employs over 2.5 million people directly and indirectly and generates sales 
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revenues of 111 billion euros (EUROMIND, 2008b). This study focuses on 
European shipbuilding, with reference to the Norwegian context.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section considers the issues fac-
ing the owners of shipbuilding firms in Norway. Then advantages and disad-
vantages of interfirm collaboration in shipbuilding are highlighted. Then the 
research method is presented. The findings of the study are presented in Sec-
tion 6. Then conclusions and implications for practitioners and policy-makers 
are presented.  
2. The Norwegian Maritime Context 
The maritime business is one of the most important economic activities in 
Norway. This cluster relates to shipping companies, ship consultants, ship-
yards, ship brokers, and ship service firms (Benito et al., 2003). The Norwe-
gian maritime cluster and energy cluster are viewed as two global leaders 
(Reve, 2008). Norwegian government policy seeks to enhance the importance 
of the maritime industry (NHD, 2007). The budget to strengthen innovation, 
competence development and research in the maritime industry has increased, 
and it equated to 252 million Norwegian kroner in 2008 (Marine Norway, 
2007). Shipbuilding is a vital part of the maritime cluster. In 2009, there were 
twenty eight shipyards, and they employed approximately 37,000 people 
(Hervik et al., 2009). The sales revenues generated by Norwegian shipyards 
related to approximately 11 billion Norwegian kroner in 2005 (NHD, 2007). 
Norwegian maritime firms specialize in the production of high-value added 
vessels. Over the last thirty years, the Norwegian shipbuilding industry has 
had to deal with structural changes, and it has adjusted to new market condi-
tions.  
Several problems confront Norwegian shipbuilding. There are general prob-
lems facing world shipbuilding. The main challenge is cyclicality in the ship-
building industry (Volk, 1994). This cyclicality relates to uneven demand for 
new ships, fluctuating prices for ship construction, and general uncertainty in 
the industry. Further, this cyclicality can lead to skill shortages and other re-
source deficiencies in shipbuilding firms. Notably, there can be insufficient re-
sources at the peak of the shipbuilding cycle and a surplus of resources during 
the trough of the cycle. Shipbuilding is still labour intensive and many young 
people do not want to join the industry. Throughout Europe, shipbuilding 
firms are dealing with an ageing workforce (Bruce and Garrard, 1999). 
Norwegian shipbuilding firms face specific problems. The main problem is 
the threat of low-cost production by shipyards in Asia (Takla, 2007). To sat-
isfy European Union (EU) competition policy, the Norwegian Government 
withdrew subsidies to Norwegian shipbuilding firms in 2000 (Lismoen, 2000). 
The issue of subsidies to shipbuilding firms is a topic of hot discussions in in-
ternational organizations such as the Organisation of Economic Development 
and Cooperation (OECD) and the EU. EU competition policy suggests subsi- 
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dies to shipbuilders need to be phased-out completely. Governments that ap-
preciate a world surplus of ship production are seeking to reduce subsidies that 
keep costly, inefficient and less competitive shipyards in business.  
During the depression period in the shipbuilding industry between 2001 and 
2003, Norwegian shipbuilding firms major sacked numerous qualified workers 
and engineers (Norwegian Maritime Industries, 2005). Owners of many ship-
yards, however, sought to preserve core competences relating to ship design, 
project management, organization, information and communication technolo-
gies, procurement and financing. During the recovery and peak phases in 
world shipbuilding between 2004 and 2008, Norwegian shipbuilding firms 
had to deal with skill shortages. This problem was solved with the help of in-
ternational sub-contractors and the employment of foreign specialists. It seems 
that this trend of covering the human resource gap with foreign specialists will 
continue in the future (Norwegian Maritime Industries, 2005). Nevertheless, 
some Norwegian shipbuilding firms are still highly competitive and they have 
identified several niche markets in which they have a competitive advantage. 
Several strategies have been used to secure a competitive advantage. The first 
strategy relates to mergers and acquisitions. There is a clear trend towards 
consolidation within the Norwegian shipbuilding industry (e.g. Bergen Group, 
STX Europe, etc.). This strategy allows firms to externally acquire resources 
and competences. Some shipyards have adopted a differentiation strategy. 
They have identified and exploited new niches relating to the production and 
repair of oil rigs and offshore equipment. Some shipbuilding firms have 
switched completely to offshore production, while others have combined 
shipbuilding and offshore activities.  
A cost reduction strategy has also been selected. Ship construction is a la-
bour intensive process. The high labour costs in Norway (Takla, 2007) does 
not allow Norwegian shipbuilding firms to compete with Asian firms with re-
gard to the production of dry bulk and crude-oil tankers, which are regarded as 
relatively simple vessels to construct. Norwegian firms can achieve significant 
cost reductions if they outsource hull production to low-cost countries in 
South, Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey. Hulls produced abroad can by 
outfitted by Norwegian yards. During the outfitting phase, Norwegian ship-
building firms subcontract parts of ship construction to Polish, Lithuanian, 
Latvian, Bulgarian, and Romanian firms that construct vessels in Norway 
(Dagens Næringsliv, 2006).  
Norwegian shipbuilding firms specialize in high-value added vessels, such 
as offshore ships (i.e. platform supply vessels, cable-layers and seismic ships), 
fishing boats, Ro-Ros, and chemical tankers. Innovative Norwegian firms can 
maintain a competitive advantage by leveraging the skills of shipowners, naval 
architects, suppliers, and competitors (Hervik et al., 2009). Norwegian ship-
building firms can enhance their competitive advantage by developing and 




An industrial context can shape the nature of collaboration (Baum et al., 
2000). Hervik and Jakobsen (2001) studied relationships between actors in the 
Norwegian shipbuilding market. They found that the strongest collaborative 
relationships at the national level were between shipyards and ship equipment 
suppliers, and between shipyards and shipping companies. The shipping com-
panies also had intense relationships with equipment suppliers. Ship consult-
ants were found to be linked to shipowners, equipment producers and ship-
builders. Further advances in collaboration could enhance the competitive ad-
vantage of Norwegian shipbuilding firms. Wergeland (1999) pointed out that 
the competitive advantage of the Norwegian shipyards could be increased 
through cooperation with reference to technology investment and the supply 
chain.  
3. Literature Overview  
There is a plethora of prior research focusing upon the classification of inter-
firm collaboration agreements (Casson and Mol, 2006; Contractor and Lo-
range, 1988). Transaction-cost theories, for example, suggest that collabora-
tive agreements are intermediate forms between market transactions and an in-
tegrated company (Williamson, 1975). The shaded area in Figure 1 comprises 
collaborative agreements. Interfirm collaborative agreements are often loosely 
labelled with the term ‘strategic alliances’. Strategic alliance is a form of inter-
firm collaboration. Strategic alliances are viewed as “relatively enduring inter-
firm cooperative arrangements that utilize resources and / or governance struc-
tures from autonomous organizations” (Inkpen, 1998: 69). 
Interfirm collaborative agreements comprise a wide range of organizational 
forms from fairly simple contracts such as license agreements, long term cus-
tomer-supplier agreements, technology share contracts, R&D partnerships to 
joint ventures where parties own stakes of a common legal entity. Alliances 
are a popular research topic in management research (Aggarwal and Hsu, 
2009; Schilling, 2009). Parkhe (1991: 579) stressed that ”[gaining] competi-
tive advantage increasingly depends not only on a company’s internal capa-
bilities, but also on the types of its alliances and the scope of its relationships 
with other companies”.  
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Scope of Enterprise Networks
 
Source:  Jagdev and Thoben (2001). 
There is no widely used definition of strategic alliance. Nevertheless, scholars 
agree that the necessary condition is the preservation of participating firm’s 
independence (Dussauge and Garrette, 1999). Teece (1992: 3) defined strate-
gic alliances as “… agreements characterized by the commitment of two or 
more firms to reach a common goal entailing the pooling of their resources 
and activities”. 
4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Interfirm Collaboration 
Previous research has found that interfirm collaboration is associated with 
benefits and drawbacks for collaborators. Firms can learn from their collabora-
tion partners. Learning may be a goal of a collaborative arrangement, or it may 
be a beneficial by-effect (Todeva and Knocke, 2005). Mowery et al. (1996) 
suggest that a strategic alliance is a channel for transferring and creating novel 
organizational capabilities. Equity-based alliances are viewed as being supe-
rior to contract-based alliances in terms of transfer of complex capabilities. 
Furthermore, successful knowledge management, cultural proximity between 
partners, alliance management skills, and learning can be generated by strate-
gic alliances (Inkpen, 1998). 
Firms engaged in interfirm collaboration can share complementary compe-
tences with their partners. Further, the partners may share resources. Combs 
and Ketchen (1999) argue that resource deficient firms engage in interfirm 
collaboration in order to gain access to critical resources (Lambe et al., 2002). 
Firms can reduce their risk exposure by developing interfirm collaborative 
relationships, particularly with regard to the generation and exploitation of 
novel technologies (Wildeman, 1998). Further, partners engaged in collabora-
tive relationships can reduce their cost bases. Joint marketing agreements may 
enable collaborating firms to reduce their communication and advertising 
costs. Joint R&D is a mechanism to reduce costs related to the generation of  
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new innovations and new product development. 
Interfirm cooperative arrangements can be associated with several draw-
backs. Cooperative arrangements can fail to achieve their goals (Child et al., 
2005). Strategic alliances can be difficult to manage (Harrigan, 1988; Das and 
Teng, 2000). Coordination costs relating to the management of some types of 
strategic alliances can be high (Gulati, 1999).  
Potential drawbacks might arise due to conflicts between the parties, which 
can be related to a lack of strategic fit, goal inconsistency, inter-organizational 
culture difference, and low level of coordination efficiency (Freiling, 2004). 
Risk is associated with all types of interfirm collaboration. Notably, partners 
might incur financial resource-deficiency and / or market opportunity risk 
(Child et al., 2005). Participating firms bear a risk of partner opportunism 
(Das, 2004). Opportunistic behaviour is defined as “self-interest seeking with 
guile” (Williamson, 1975: 9). Collaborative partners might have different 
views and expectations on their own contribution, as well as their partners’ 
contribution. Firm managers might get upset when their partners violate the 
norms and the principle of reciprocity in strategic alliances (Todeva and 
Knocke, 2005). Additionally, the time used by top managers to negotiate and 
implement the alliance might be significant, a firm’s knowledge might leak to 
a partner, and some capabilities might atrophy (Day, 1995; Varadarajan and 
Cunningham, 1995).  
Careful partner screening and selection can reduce the problem of opportun-
istic behaviour by a partner (Parkhe, 1993). Information and communication 
(ICT) tools can encourage management flexibility and efficiency (Xie and 
Johnston, 2004). Additional evidence is required surrounding methods of best 
and worst practice relating to collaborative partner selection, and subsequent 
collaborative behaviour by shipbuilding firms. 
5. Method  
The unit of analysis in this study is a firm and an interfirm cooperative ar-
rangement initiated by the shipbuilding firms. Semi-structured personal inter-
views were conducted with twenty-one owners, executives and managers of 
Norwegian, Polish and Ukrainian shipbuilding firms. Issues relating to the 
aims of joining cooperative agreements; resources and competences which 
shipbuilding firms and their collaborators contribute to joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, and other collaborative arrangements; and how collaborative strate-
gies were related to the phase of the shipbuilding cycle were explored. Archi-
val data and information from the Internet were also collected.  
6.  Findings: Special Features of Interfirm Collaboration in Norwegian 
Shipbuilding 
Shipbuilding firms (shipyards, ship design firms, and suppliers) collaborate 
with each other and they also collaborate with shipowners, financial institu-
tions, and shipbrokers. Interfirm collaboration in shipbuilding can relate to  
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functional areas such as sales, marketing, production, engineering and techni-
cal support procurement, and financing (Table 1). Further, interfirm collabora-
tion can be linked to issues associated with the production chain in shipbuild-
ing, which is illustrated in Figure 2. The first stage relates to the concept and 
sales. Here, a shipowner might cooperate with a ship broker, a ship design 
firm and / or shipyards.  
Tab. 1: Interfirm collaboration in functional areas 
Functional area  Nature of interfirm collaboration 
Sales  Cooperation between shipowners and shipbrokers in order to ob-
tain new contracts. Market collaboration may be executed be-
tween a shipyard and its customers: shipping companies, ship-
brokers, investors and government organizations. 
Marketing  Joint marketing agreements. 
Production  Alliances with subcontractors (e.g. metal cutting, hull produc-
tion, welding, painting, and electrical installations). 
Engineering and 
technical support 
Interfirm collaboration in ship design, computer-aided design 
and computer-aided manufacturing with naval architect firms 
and ship consultants.  
Procurement  Purchasing and material management are important vectors of 
shipyard’s strategies because equipment, materials and sub-
contractor services constitute between sixty to eighty per cent of 
a shipyard’s production costs (Bruce and Garrard, 1999). Col-
laboration in the procurement area may vary from very simple 
forms relating to long-term contracts to buy goods and services 
toward complicated forms relating to the outsourcing of parts 
production and joint new product development. 
Financing    Different forms of collaboration relating to bank consortia 
(Stopford, 2009) and joint ventures between shipping compa-
nies, shipyards and ship design firms. 
R&D   Joint R&D projects among shipowners, ship design firms, sup-
pliers, shipyards and research institutions. 
Source: By  author. 
Some shipowners have cooperative relationships with ship design firms and 
shipyards (Hervik et al., 2009). Collaboration might be informal or formal 
with reference to a joint venture. Shipyards might collaborate horizontally 
with reference to a joint marketing agreement, which shares the marketing 
costs. With reference to the basic design and detail engineering stages, col-
laboration between ship design firms, shipowners, suppliers of equipment and 
shipyards is realized. The third stage relates to procurement. The shipowners 
and suppliers cooperate with each other and develop joint R&D projects (Teng  
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and Das, 2007). Supplier alliances can become more popular (Kannan and 
Tan, 2004). Suppliers outsource production in order to reduce costs, enter new 
markets and / or to address resource and competence gaps. The next stages re-
lates to fabrication and production. Here, both horizontal and vertical collabo-
ration is realized. In Norway, hull production and outfitting is frequently per-
formed by different shipyards. Usually hull shipyards and outfitting shipyards 
cooperate with each other through frame contracts to deliver specified 
amounts of tonnage (Solesvik, 2009). The hull shipyard might collaborate 
with its sub-contractors. 

















Source:  EUROMIND (2008a). 
During the outfitting stage, an outfitting shipyard cooperates with suppliers of 
equipment and sub-contractors. Finally, during the commissioning stage, the 
ship systems are checked and tested before the vessel is delivered to the shi-
powner. With reference to each stage of the shipbuilding production chain, 
ICT solutions are applied to facilitate coordination between partners (EU-
ROMIND, 2008b). 
In order to secure a competitive advantage and to reduce the negative ef-
fects of shipbuilding cycles, Norwegian shipbuilding firms consider develop-
ing cooperative relationships with other firms. Some shipbuilding firms en-
gage in collaboration proactively if their managers anticipate resource and 
competence shortages or surpluses with reference to the next phase in the 
shipbuilding cycle. This allows them to be engaged in cooperative arrange-
ments earlier than other shipbuilding firms. These firms could potentially reap 
first-mover collaboration benefits. Proactive and reactive cooperative strate-
gies are illustrated in Table 2.   
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Tab. 2: Description of cases 
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Source: By  author. 
Interfirm collaboration can relate to mergers and acquisitions, market transac-
tions, and internal development (Parkhe, 1993). Collaborative arrangements 
enable firms to reduce costs, to obtain new knowledge, and to secure a strong 
market position (Child et al., 2005). In the uncertain shipbuilding industry, 
firms are forced to adapt quickly to changes in the environment and to changes 
in the demand for ships. It is often difficult for a firm to internally develop or 
purchase necessary resources and competences required to deal swiftly with 
changes (Burgers et al., 1993). To ensure competitive advantage, some Nor- 
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wegian shipbuilding firms will select an interfirm cooperative strategy with 
other firms to ensure necessary resources and competences can be leveraged.  
Norwegian shipbuilding firms face problems related to the high level of com-
petition in the industry, uncertainty caused by industrial cyclicality, and high 
cost levels.  
7. Conclusions and Implications 
There are several important implications for owners of shipbuilding firms and 
practitioners from the shipbuilding industry which are interested in gaining 
and keeping competitive advantage and policy-makers, who are concerned 
with promoting Norwegian shipbuilding. 
Implications for Owners of Shipbuilding Firms and Practitioners 
The findings of this study might be useful for practitioners to understand their 
alternatives and their tradeoffs from interfirm collaboration in shipbuilding. 
Practitioners in the maritime cluster include shipbuilding firm owners, shi-
powners, suppliers, shipbrokers, R&D and financial institutions, venture capi-
talists, insurance companies, shipping media, local maritime organizations, 
and educational institutions whose business activity is related to shipbuilding. 
Practitioners and shipbuilding firms’ owners in Norway and Europe face com-
petition from Japanese, South Korean, Chinese, and Indian shipyards. Fur-
thermore, the Governments of these Asian countries provide substantial subsi-
dies to shipbuilding firms. In contrast, Norwegian and other European ship-
building firms get marginal financial support from the state. This makes com-
petition in the international shipbuilding market even more difficult. Besides, 
the world shipbuilding industry faces the adverse influence of business cycli-
cality in an industry where periods of high demand for newbuildings change 
with the periods of low demand for new ships.  
Norwegian and European shipyards are advised to utilize more effectively 
interfirm cooperation to compete with shipbuilding firms from the East. Ex-
ecutives of the shipbuilding firms should be aware of possibilities to smooth 
cyclicality in the industry by engagement to interfirm cooperation proactively. 
The benefits of interfirm cooperation are straightforward. However, managers 
and owners of shipbuilding firms should be conscious that engagement into 
interfirm cooperation might decrease independence of the firms. Some ship-
building firms mastered interfirm collaborative strategies to manage negative 
consequences of the shipbuilding cycle. They proactively engage in collabora-
tive relations in order to provide new contracts and get necessary resources 
and competences.  
Moreover, the results suggest that practitioners in shipbuilding industry and 
owners of shipbuilding firms should consider carefully their interfirm collabo-
rative strategies. Depending on the phase of the shipbuilding cycle, as well as 
current and future resource and competence needs, practitioners and shipbuild-
ing firm owners employ different strategies.   
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Shipbuilding firm owners and managers willing to benefit from interfirm 
collaboration should build and leverage alliance competence. Skills and com-
petences are necessary to manage strategic alliances and to select the right 
partners.  
Implications for Policy-Makers  
Several issues are facing Norwegian shipbuilding firms. Norwegian shipbuild-
ers work in the niche markets of specialized vessels such as fishing vessels, 
offshore ships, research vessels, ferries, and chemical tankers. However, the 
competing shipbuilding firms from the low-cost countries penetrate some of 
these niche markets as well, attracting customers with lower prices for new-
buildings.  
Another important issue surrounding competitive activity between the 
Asian and European shipbuilding firms is government subsidies. The policy of 
the European Union/European Economic Area is straightforward – shipbuild-
ing firms shall be marginally subsidized. The ceiling for state aid is limited to 
9% for a large vessel of over EUR 10 million of value, and 4.5% for smaller 
vessels which value is under this amount (GIEK, 2009). At the same time, 
government aid is a popular tool of Asian (especially South Korean and Chi-
nese) policy-makers who aim at winning a competitive game against other na-
tional shipbuilding firms. Another barrier is the large degree of domestic com-
petition among the shipbuilding firms.  
Policy-makers in Norway are concerned with the further promotion of the 
Norwegian shipbuilding industry and keeping competitive advantage of the 
national shipbuilding. Shipbuilding provides jobs for populations and contrib-
utes to a country’s economic development. Several programs currently assist 
shipbuilding firms, such as MAROFF and MARUT. These support programs 
were established in order to support core competences of the Norwegian ship-
yards in innovative design, finance, project management, organization, infor-
mation and communication technologies, procurement and financing 
(Forskningsrådet, 2009; Marut, 2009). MARUT and MAROFF programs sup-
port cooperation between research institutions and shipbuilding firms in new 
product development: in other words, support R&D cooperation. This was 
made with the aim to move away from the subsidiary nature of state support, 
which contradicted the European Union policy to support indirect methods of 
aid aimed at competence and innovation development. The Norwegian state 
provides also financial support of shipbuilding firms through the Guarantee 
Institute for Export Credits (GIEK). GIEK is a governmental guarantee or-
ganization which supports the shipbuilding industry through several schemes. 
One of such schemes is a building loan guarantee for shipbuilding industry 
where GIEK shares up to 50 per cent of the risk of the building loan bank 
(GIEK, 2009).  
Consequently, the findings of this paper have important implications for  
 
77
policy-makers. First, people who promote development of Norwegian ship-
building shall take into consideration benefits of cooperative strategies. A 
number of initiatives can be directed to support interfirm collaboration of the 
shipbuilding firms with shipowners, suppliers of ship equipment, ship design-
ers, and shipyards.  
Second, support programs should be developed with regard to the phases of 
the shipbuilding cycle. This study revealed that resource and competence 
needs of the shipbuilding firms are different during various phases of the ship-
building cycle. Consequently, the nature of the government support required 
for shipbuilding firms is dynamic.  
Third, this research demonstrates that one of the key objectives of policy 
measures is to address competence development in the shipbuilding firms, in-
cluding alliance and outsourcing competences. A possible step of policy-
makers is to promote interfirm cooperation within existing maritime networks 
which are quite popular in Norway. Furthermore, interfirm cooperation might 
be stimulated on international level by encouraging cooperation with foreign 
firms. Policy-makers have acknowledged that information and communication 
technology competences and resources facilitate intra-firm and interfirm coop-
eration (EUROMIND, 2008a). Policy-makers may need to take steps to de-
velop ICT competences of Norwegian shipbuilders.  
Generally, support programs in Norway are not industry specific. The ex-
ceptions are agriculture and the shipbuilding industry. Governmental programs 
might consider ordering research and navy ships from the Norwegian ship-
building firms during the trough and recession phases. Policy-makers and 
business development agents might consider using temporary negative re-
sources and competences which shipyards have during the trough and reces-
sion phases in other sectors. However, practitioners and policy-makers should 
acknowledge that resources and competences may be context dependent. 
Thus, their competences and resource base cannot easily be applied in other 
sectors. 
This study has revealed that Norwegian shipbuilding firms collaborate with 
foreign shipbuilders. Such interfirm collaboration has different motives. On 
the one hand, Norwegian shipbuilding firms establish strategic alliances with 
the shipbuilding firms from low-cost countries in order to reduce costs. On the 
other hand, Norwegian shipbuilders cooperate with the advanced shipbuilding 
firms and the shipowners to create innovative ships and products. This sug-
gests that policy efforts to support interfirm collaboration should take these 
differences into account. Finally, Norwegian shipbuilding firms are not a het-
erogeneous group. The size of the shipbuilding firms varies from the middle-
sized shipbuilding firms and groups to the small-sized shipbuilding firms. Pol-
icy-makers should acknowledge that initiatives promoting collaboration be-
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